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Abstract
As more and more sensitive information is entering web based applications, and
thus are available through a web browser, securing these systems is of increasing
importance. A software system accessible through the web is continuously exposed
to threats, and is accessible to anyone who would like to attempt a break-in. These
systems can not rely on only external measures like separate network zones and
firewalls for security.
Symantecs1 Internet Security Threat Report [34] is published every six months.
Main findings in the last one published prove that there is an increase in threats to
confidential information and more attacks aimed at web applications. Almost 48 per-
cent of all vulnerabilities documented the last six months of 2004 were vulnerabilities
in web applications.
Security principles that one should pay attention to developing web applications
do exist. This report have taken a look at existing guidelines, and provided an inde-
pendent guide to developing secure web applications. These guidelines will be pub-
lished at the homepage of The Centre for Information Security2 (SIS), www.norsis.no.
The report also describes how a web application has been developed using the
provided security guidelines as reference points. Relevant vulnerabilities and threats
were identified and described. Misuse cases have related the various threats to specific
system functionality, and a risk analysis ranks the threats in order to see which ones
are most urgent.
During the design phase, the application areas exposed to threats with a high
rank from the risk analysis, have been at center of attention. This is also the case
in the implementation phase, where countermeasures to some of these threats are
provided on the Java platform. The implemented solutions can be adapted by others
developing applications on this platform.
The report comes to the conclusion, that the use of security guidelines throughout
the entire development process is useful when developing a secure system.
1Symantec works with information security providing software, appliances and services designed
to secure and manage IT infrastructures [33].
2The Centre for Information Security (SIS) is responsible for coordinating activities related to
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) security in Norway. The centre receives reports
about security related incidents from companies and departments, and is working on obtaining an
overall impression of threats towards Norwegian ICT systems [30].
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Introduction
A web application is a piece of distributed software that uses the Internet as commu-
nication channel. Web applications are exposed to a number of threats, and many
considerations have to be made in order to develop secure web systems.
Secode3 did a survey [24] for their customers over a period of two years, searching
for security breaches in web applications. They discovered that as much as 81% of
the web applications tested had one or more critical security breaches. The most
common vulnerabilities were lack of input validation, lack of encryption, username
and passwords stored as plaintext in scripts, and defective logout procedures in the
applications.
Vulnerabilities is hard to fix with security patches4. Security problems should
therefore be identified early in a development process. Ad hoc solutions to security
problems, may create new vulnerabilities and new security holes.
This report will describe the development of a web application, where the main
focus is on security. This will be done by first defining security guidelines, that will
work as reference points during the development process. Then vulnerabilities and
threats will be described, along with countermeasures. The application will be devel-
oped according to the waterfall model, and will go through a requirement engineering
phase, a design phase, and an implementation phase. Testing and maintenance are
also important elements of the waterfall model, but are left out, as the focus of this
report is on security during design and implementation.
In the requirement engineering phase, we will identify functional- and system
requirements, but also security requirements. The security requirements will be
modeled by misuse cases, which emphasize how, and where, threats to various func-
tionality may appear, and suggest countermeasures. In addition, the threats that
affects the system, will go through a risk analysis, and be ranked in order of the
probability of occurring in the application.
In the design phase, we will design the system using our security guidelines to
prevent the threats identified in the requirement phase. The security guidelines will
hopefully help us to choose a sensible architecture.
The Java technology is well known, and commonly used to develop web based
applications. We will be using JavaServer Pages (JSP) to implement our design. The
intent of the implementation, is to shed light on vulnerable processes in the applica-
tion, and provide technology specific solutions.
It will be of great interest for us to find out if our suggested security guidelines
will serve as good reference points during the design- and implementation phase. If
3Secode is a leading Digital Security Company in the Nordic region [24].
4A patch is a piece of object code that is inserted into an executable program, and is a fix to a
program bug [44].
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this is so, we hope that these guidelines can be adapted as a template to other people
developing web applications.
In addition, we hope that the solutions we will be implementing on the Java
platform, will be found useful for other developers, and that our solutions may be
useful in their work.
Chapter 1
Web applications and
security issues
This report concerns web applications. To familiarize with the setting in which they
exist, this chapter will provide basic information that will be referenced throughout
this report.
The Internet is a massive network of networks. It connects millions of computers
together globally, forming a network infrastructure, where all connected computers
can communicate with each other.
The World Wide Web (WWW), or simply the web, is a way of accessing informa-
tion over this medium. It is an information-sharing model that is built on top of the
Internet, using the underlying Hyper Text Transfer Protocol1 (HTTP) to transmit
data. Web applications communicate using the HTTP protocol over the web. Users
can log on to web applications via their web browser although they might be far
away from the server the system is installed on.
This chapter will start off defining what a web application is, and move on to
presenting security issues concerning both general computer systems, and web appli-
cations. There will be a description of different attacks that can be directed towards
these systems, and countermeasures to circumvent them.
1.1 Web applications
In essence, a web application is a client/server software application that interacts
with users or systems using HTTP [20]. The client can be a web browser like MS
Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator, where users are able to view pages and to
interact by sending requests to and from the system.
Web applications are often built using a three-tiered architecture. This architec-
ture consists, as shown in Figure 1.1, of three logical tiers, namely the presentation
tier, application tier and the data tier [20].
The first tier, the presentation tier, is responsible for presenting data to end users
or systems. This tier include web browsers and web servers. They may also include
application components that create the page layout [20].
1HTTP defines how messages are formatted and transmitted, and what actions web servers and
browsers should take in response to various commands [44].
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Figure 1.1: Web applications can be made up by three logical tiers as depicted in
the figure above. A presentation tier that interacts with the user, an application tier
that handles the business logic, and a data tier that stores the data.
The second tier, the application tier, is the engine of a web application. It per-
forms the business logic, like processing user input, making decisions, obtaining more
data and sends data to the presentation tier which presents it to the user [20].
The third tier is the data tier, which is used to store things needed by the appli-
cation, and acts as a repository for both temporary and permanent data. It is the
bank vault of a web application [20].
1.2 Definition of security
Computer security rests on the concept of preserving authentication, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability [5]. The overall goal is to maintain these aspects when
developing computer systems.
Authentication is the process of uniquely identifying the clients of your applica-
tions and services [44]. There are three main factors that can be used to authenticate
users. The user can be authenticated on the bases of something the user knows (for
instance a password), something the user has (like nonce words or a smartcard2), or
something that the user is (for example a fingerprint) [41].
Confidentiality, also referred to as privacy, is the process of making sure that data
remains private and confidential, and that it cannot be viewed by unauthorized users
or eavesdroppers. Access control mechanisms and encryption3 is frequently used to
enforce confidentiality.
2A card that has electronic logic embedded in it. Smartcards are commonly used to authenticate
users for access control purposes [46].
3Encryption is scrambling of data so that only the authorized recipient can read it [44]. This
will be thoroughly described in section 1.4.
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Integrity is the guarantee that data is protected from unauthorized modification.
Like confidentiality, integrity is a key concern for data passed over networks. In-
tegrity for data in transit is typically provided by hashing techniques and message
authentication codes4 (MAC).
Availability refers to the ability to use the information or resource desired. That
is, that the system remains available to legitimate users. The aspect of availability
that is relevant to security, is that someone may deliberately arrange to deny access
to data or to a service by making it unavailable.
Another aspect of security that should be emphasized, is authorization. This is
the process that governs the resources and operations that authenticated clients are
permitted to access [32].
When introducing web applications and security issues, there are core terms that
needs to be defined. These are assets, threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and counter-
measures. We have used the same notations as the Open Web Application Security
Project5 (OWASP) to define these terms.
Asset. An asset is a resource of value such as the data in a database, or on the file
system, or a system resource.
Threat. A threat is a potential occurrence, malicious or otherwise, that may harm
an asset.
Vulnerability. A weakness that make a threat possible.
Attack. An attack is an action taken to harm an asset.
Countermeasures. A safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates a risk. In
this report it is important to notice that the main goal is to prevent attacks on
security. Safety issues6 will not be handled in this report.
Security is about protecting assets, and is more of a path than a destination.
When analyzing infrastructure and applications, one may identify potential threats
and understand that each threat represents a degree of risk. Security is thus about
risk management and implementing effective countermeasures.
When creating software and web applications, we should strive the maintain four
fundamental principles of security. There are always those who wants illegitimate
access to assets held by the system, or information that flows over the network. They
get this access by performing attacks directed at the systems.
1.3 Attacks on security
Security is threatened when attackers tries to break into a system without permission.
There are two ways of attacking a system. Either by performing an active attack or
a passive attack. An active attack attempts to alter system resources or affect their
operations. A passive attack attempts to learn from, or make use of, information
4A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a one-way hash computed from a message and some
secret data. Its purpose is to detect if the message has been altered [44].
5The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an open-source software project
organization, which produces many types of materials in a collaborative, open way. OWASP is
dedicated to finding and fighting the causes of insecure software [19].
6Safety issues are for instance problems concerning network capacity, the servers handling of
many simultaneous users and the handling and consequences of down-time of a computer system.
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from the system, but does not affect the resources [32]. These two forms of attacks,
will be presented next.
Active attacks
Active attacks involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a
false stream and can be subdivided into four categories, namely masquerade, replay,
modification of messages, and denial of services [32].
Figure 1.2: Masquerade.
A masquerade, shown in Figure 1.2, takes place when one entity in a communi-
cation process pretends to be a different entity. Masquerade attacks usually includes
other active attacks. For instance, authentication sequences can be captured and
replayed after a valid authentication sequence has taken place, thus enabling an au-
thorized entity with few privileges, to obtain extra privileges by impersonating an
entity that has those privileges.
Figure 1.3: Replay.
Figure 1.3 shows a replay attack, that involves the passive capture of a data unit
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and its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect.
Figure 1.4: Modification of messages.
Modification of messages simply means that some portion of a legitimate message
is altered, or that messages are delayed or reordered, to produce an unauthorized
effect. The attack is depicted in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.5: Denial of services.
Figure 1.5 shows how a Denial of Service (DoS) attack prevents or inhibits the
normal use or management of communications facilities. This attack may have a spe-
cific target, for example, an entity may suppress all messages directed to a particular
destination. Another form of service denial is the disruption of an entire network,
either by disabling the network or by overloading it with messages so as to degrade
performance.
Passive attacks
Passive attacks are eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions. The goal of
the attacker is to obtain information that is being transmitted. There are two types
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of passive attacks, namely release of message content and traffic analysis [32].
Figure 1.6: Release of message content.
Figure 1.6 shows the passive attack release of message content. What happens, is
that an attacker gets his or her hands on confidential information. The information
can for instance be shared through e-mail, telephone or transferred files. To avoid
release of message content, messages can be encrypted.
Figure 1.7: Traffic analysis.
Figure 1.7 describes the traffic analysis attack. What happens, is that an attacker
analyzes the stream of messages that is sent between users. Then the attacker tries
to extract a pattern from the sent messages, to potentially reveal its content.
Passive attacks are difficult to detect because they do not alter any data. It is
feasible to protect data by using encryption. The best way of dealing with passive
attacks, is prevention rather than detection.
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1.4 Countermeasures
Most security products available today are technical solutions that target a specific
type of issue, problem or protocol weaknesses. Most of them are products retrofitting
security into existing infrastructure, including tools such as application layer firewalls
and host/network based Intrusion Detection Systems7 (IDS).
People argue that the only secure host is the one that is unplugged. Even if
that were true, an unplugged host is of no functional use, and is therefore hardly
a practical solution to the security problem. But zero risk is not practical, nor
achievable either. The goal should be to determine what the appropriate level of
security is for the application to function as planned in its environment. This process
normally involves accepting some level of risk.
For some risks, the only way to manage them, are to accept them. For instance,
if a company has a software system in a closed network, threats only come from
within. But if the company finds it necessary for employees to access this system
outside their closed network, they have to accept the fact that anyone connected to
the Internet can attempt a break-in. This will make the system far more exposed to
attacks.
Security will almost always bring about some overhead, either in cost or in perfor-
mance. It is no use spending a lot of money securing assets that is not very important
to secure. Therefore, one should decide which assets one have to secure, and find a
way to secure them. To determine what the core assets are, is a key task. This is
part of the process of getting to know what needs to be secured.
It is possible to mitigate risks using countermeasures. Following is a list with
several techniques that can be employed to reduce the risk of security being compro-
mised. Techniques that are emphasized in definitions will be explained immediately
in upcoming descriptions.
Encryption. Encryption is the conversion of plaintext or data into unintelligible
form by means of a reversible translation, based on a translation table or al-
gorithm. One can encrypt by means of symmetric encryption or asymmetric
encryption [32].
Symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Symmetric encryption is a form of cryp-
tosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the same key.
Asymmetric encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and de-
cryption are performed using two different keys, where one of them is referred
to as the public key and the other is referred to as the private key [32].
Public and private key. The public key is one of the two keys used in an asym-
metric encryption system. The public key is made public, to be used in con-
junction with a corresponding private key. The private key is the other of the
two keys used in an asymmetric encryption system. For secure communication,
the private key should only be known to its creator [32].
Secure Socket Layer (SSL). One way to encrypt data is by using the Secure
Socket Layer (SSL). SSL is used for authentication and to establish basic pa-
rameters for subsequent interaction [32].
7An Intrusion Detection Systems is an automated system that can detect a security violation on
a system or a network [44].
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Digital signature. A digital signature is an authentication mechanism that enables
the creator of a message to attach a code that acts as a signature. The signature
guarantees the source and integrity of the message [32]. This can be used when
users of a computer system should be able to identify themselves to other users.
Data signing Digital signatures can be created using data signing. This is done
by encrypting data using the private key, then anyone who is able to correctly
decrypt the data, can easily prove the data origin. Correct decryption means
that the data was encrypted by the corresponding public key. As the private
key is always kept private and never leaves the possession of the person who
generated it, the correct data decryption is proof of their origin [32].
Strong encryption. Strong encryption is plaintext encrypted with ciphers 8 that
are essentially unbreakable without the decryption keys [44].
Strong authentication. Authentication is, as mentioned before, the process of
uniquely identifying the clients of your applications and services. Strong au-
thentication is when the identities of networked users, clients and servers are
verified without transmitting passwords over the network [44]. Strong authen-
tication refers to systems that require multiple factors to identify users when
they access private networks and applications. A common example of multi-
factor authentication is your ATM card or bank card. This requires something
you have (your card), and something you know (your PIN). This only leaves
out the third factor of authentication, namely the part of something you are.
Data hashing. Data hashing is when users produce hash values for accessing data
or for security. A hash value (or simply hash), also called a message digest, is
a number generated from a string of text. The hash is substantially smaller
than the text itself, and is generated by a formula in such a way that it is ex-
tremely unlikely that some other text will produce the same hash value. Hashes
play a role in security systems where they’re used to ensure that transmitted
messages have not been tampered with. The sender generates a hash of the
message, encrypts it, and sends it with the message itself. The recipient then
decrypts both the message and the hash, produces another hash from the re-
ceived message, and compares the two hashes. If they’re the same, there is a
very high probability that the message was transmitted intact. If a user wants
to make sure that transmitted data has not been tampered with, one can make
use of the data hashing technique [32].
Principle of least privilege. The principle of least privilege requires that a user
be given no more privilege than necessary to perform a job. Ensuring least
privilege requires identifying what the user’s job is, determining the minimum
set of privileges required to perform that job, and restricting the user to a
domain with those privileges and nothing more. By denying subjects transac-
tions that are not necessary for the performance of their duties. The denied
privileges can therefore not be exploited by an attacker [42].
Audit trails. An audit trail is a series of records of computer events or user activ-
ities. It is generated by an auditing system that monitors system activity [42].
8Chipers are systems of concealing a message by substituting individual letters, numbers or
symbols with other letters, numbers or symbols. Cipher systems are usually based on a key, or
method of encryption [44].
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Audit trails can for example prove that actions performed by users actually
have taken place in the system.
1.5 Summary
This chapter has defined web applications and the setting in which they operate.
Security was defined as preserving the fundamental principles authentication, con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability. This chapter also introduced how security
might be compromised by groups of attack, and identified some widespread counter-
measures. This is material that will be referenced and elaborated more thoroughly
throughout the report.
Chapter 2
Security guidelines
Guidelines are developed to point out important aspects that one should be aware of
in different contexts. The guidelines presented in this chapter are high-level security
principles concerning software development. They include examples, and have been
divided into a general section and a section aimed specifically at developing a sub
group of software systems, that is web applications. The general section provides
principles that one should pay attention to regardless of the kind of system being
developed.
We will be making practical use of both of the groups of guidelines when de-
veloping a secure web application in this project. Later on in this report, we will
illustrate how they translate, in more specific details, to various parts of the devel-
opment process. One goal of our project, is to work by these guidelines all through
the development process. That is, to be security conscious from the first point in
the development process and onwards. This is something that we want to empha-
size, although being security conscious during the entire process is not a stand-alone
guideline. Keeping the focus on security will be referred to throughout the report.
2.1 General security guidelines
This section will present general security guidelines that can be used during devel-
opment of software systems. They should always be kept in mind, and may provide
useful reference points on which one may base design and implementation decisions.
2.1.1 Validate input
When input is referred to, both user- and system input is implied [42]. Although
two systems are interconnected and mutually authenticated to each other, there is
no guarantee that input coming from one of them hasn’t been corrupted during
transmission.
Input to and from a system is the route for malicious payloads that may compro-
mise the system. The best strategy for dealing with input and output is to allow only
input explicitly defined and drop all other data. Input should therefore be ensured to
be both appropriate and expected [20]. Functions that handles the validation must
decide if a given input matches expected format. For instance, if input from a user
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is expected to be an email address, the input should be checked to see if it contains
a string, an @, an address, a dot and a top level domain name1.
If input is not properly validated, an attacker can enter input that will overflow
buffers2 in a computer system. What happens is, that there is put more data into
a buffer then the buffer can handle. This can result in that the attacker makes the
entire system crash, or that he or she creates a back door leading to system access
[42].
2.1.2 Fail securely
Any sufficiently complex system has failure modes. Failure is unavoidable and should
be planned for. What in fact is avoidable are security problems related to failure [42]
Any security mechanism should be designed in such a way that when it fails,
it fails closed. That is, it should fail to a state that rejects all subsequent security
requests rather than allow them. An example would be a user authentication system.
If it is not able to process a request to authenticate a user, and the process crashes,
the user should not get access to the system [20].
When a system fails, it may be a problem that it reveals critical system informa-
tion [42]. For instance, error messages from the system might reveal information on
how tables and rows are organized in a database. The messages may contain infor-
mation on weaknesses that can be exploited by an attacker. Detailed error messages
should therefore never be sent to the client, but rather to a system administrator, or
to a log.
2.1.3 Keep it simple
Complexity increases the risk of problems concerning security. A complex design is
never easy to understand, and is therefore more likely to include subtle problems.
Complex code tends to be harder to maintain as well. To stay out of this kind of
trouble, design and implementation should be as straightforward as possible in a
software development process [42].
It might be tempting bo develop an elaborate and complex security control, but
this should be avoided, as users will just end up finding a way around these measures.
Even though it might be a good idea, theoretically, to assign all users a number of
passwords, and then ask for a random one of them upon authentication, it will
probably result in the user writing down all the passwords, and thereby make the
effort useless. Often the most effective security is the simplest security [19].
It is possible to make a system less complex by leading all critical security op-
erations through a choke point. At this choke point, all traffic passing through will
be checked by an interface. The choke point might for instance be a gateway that
supervises and controls all traffic, giving control of the information flow.
2.1.4 Use and reuse trusted components
When developing computer systems, it should be considered to reuse components that
are believed to be of good quality. A component is of good quality if it is thoroughly
1 A domain name is the unique name of an Internet site. A top level domain name, is the last
part of a domain address. This can be .gov for governmental institutions, .org for organizations,
.com for commercial industries and so on [44].
2An area of computer memory that is used to temporarily store data[44].
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tested by people you trust, and no documents pointing out critical weaknesses have
been published [42].
The more successful a component has proven itself to be over time , the better
reason to reuse it. Many people developing computer systems have gone through the
same kind of problems, and may have invested large amounts of time researching and
developing robust solutions to them. In many cases, components have been improved
through an iterative process.
Using and reusing trusted components makes sense both from a resource stance
and from a security viewpoint. When someone else has proven they got it right it is
beneficial to take advantage of it [19].
For example, it is sensible to reuse cryptographic libraries. Well-used libraries are
much more likely to be robust than something put together in-house, because people
are more likely to have noticed implementation problems [42].
2.1.5 Defense in depth
The idea behind defense in depth is to manage risk with diverse defensive strategies.
It is important to make sure that various layers of security in a system works together
in harmony to supplement each others functionality, but also to overlap, so that if
one should fail, another layer will prevent a total compromise of the system [20].
It is unrealistic to rely on one component to perform its function perfectly at all
times. Predicting unexpected events may be hard, but it is certainly necessary. One
should take the necessary precautions so that if any unexpected event takes place,
there is a plan of how to take care of it.
For instance, information can be stored in a database protected with an au-
thentication mechanism where only authenticated users are given access. But if an
attacker manages to bypass the security mechanisms, the information stored in the
database will be disclosed. Encryption of sensitive data before storage, will preserve
the principal of defence in depth.
2.1.6 Secure the weakest link
Security might be looked upon as a chain. And just as a chain is no stronger than the
weakest link, a software system is only as secure as its weakest component. Attackers
will attack the weakest part of the system because they are the parts most likely to
be easily broken [42].
It is probably not possible to make a system perfectly safe of security breaches.
One can secure transits between the users browser and the web server, but there
might be lack of security elsewhere in the system. It is not enough to secure a
system at one point.
For instance, it won’t help if a computer system has a well functioning authenti-
cation mechanism, if the system has many easily available backdoors3, leading right
into the systems core. Therefore it is important to secure all aspects of the system.
3A backdoor in a computer system is a method of bypassing normal authentication or obtaining
remote access to a computer, while intended to remain hidden to casual inspection. The backdoor
may take the form of an installed program or could be a modification to a legitimate program [44].
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2.1.7 Practice the principle of least privilege
This principle states that only the minimum access necessary to perform an operation
should be granted, and that access should be granted only for the minimum amount
of time necessary [42].
Systems should be designed in such a way that they run with the least amount
of system privilege they need to do their job. This is the “need to know” approach.
If a user account doesn’t need root privileges to operate, don’t assign them in the
anticipation they may need them [20]. The reason why a system should operate in
this fashion is to avoid potential misuse and reduce the damage that can occur should
your code be exploited by a malicious user. If your code only runs with basic user
privileges, it is difficult for malicious users to do much damage with it.
2.1.8 Practice compartmentalization
The basic idea behind compartmentalization is to minimize the amount of damage
that can be done to a system by breaking up the system into as few units as possible,
while isolating code that has security privileges [42].
Similarly, compartmentalizing users, processes and data helps contain problems
if they do occur. Compartmentalization is an important concept widely adopted in
the information security realm.
In a computer system where for instance some information are public, while other
is classified, the data can be compartmentalized according to the level of security
they need. For instance, the public information can be stored on a server that can
be accessed from the Internet, while the classified information may be stored on a
server within a secure network zone.
2.1.9 Awareness
People who uses computer systems need to know how to use the system, and how to
be conscious about security issues. To communicate security policies and procedures
to users of computer systems, and getting their commitment to adopt these methods,
is an important way of lowering the risk of loss or damage to a computer system.
Users should be aware of data security and protection principles, and what actions
that might be a danger to the system security and the data confidentiality. Making
legitimate users aware of the risks they may constitute to a system they are working
with, may reduce, and even prevent, illegitimate actions and breaches in security. As
users of computer system needs privileged access to do their job, an example of user
awareness might be that a user should never write down a password, or leave his or
her workstation unattended.
2.2 Specific web application security guidelines
Compared to traditional software systems, web applications exist in challenging en-
vironments. They are potential victims of attacks launched by anyone connected to
the Internet, and we believe they should be provided separate guidelines.
Following are three guidelines aimed directly at the development of secure web
applications. They should be applied during the development process, guidelines
should be applied when developing web applications, in addition to the general ones.
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2.2.1 Validate input on the server side
When developing web applications, it is important to validate input on the server
side. All validation that takes place on the client side is exposed of being altered by
potential attackers. Input from the client side can therefore compromise the entire
system when it arrives at the server [9].
2.2.2 Encrypt communication lines
In web applications, a client communicates with one or more distributed systems.
If the information exchanged between these systems are considered sensitive, the
communication lines should be encrypted. This should be done to prevent attackers
from getting their hands on the information being sent [9].
2.2.3 Limit cache usage
Cache is local storage of remote data designed to reduce network transfers [44]. In
web applications, where data is likely to change frequently, the value of information
being up to date is great compared to more static systems.
It is important that users are provided information that is correct. For instance
in a web site publishing stock exchange information, the rate value needs to be
immediately updated in the web page should it change. In such systems, where
change is frequent, caching will not do anything good. It is more important to serve
users updated information than to save them response time by providing information
from cache instead of going all the way to the web server.
Also, web pages that contain sensitive information should not be cached. For
example, if a doctor have access to check his or her patients health records over the
Internet, and the doctor uses a computer that others also have access to, the cached
information can go devious ways. Therefore it is important not to store web pages
that contains sensitive information in cache.
2.3 Summary
This chapter has identified a total of twelve security guidelines. Together they provide
an overview of what to take into consideration when developing secure software and
applications. Most of the guidelines introduced are applicable to all software systems,
whereas the last three represents web applications more specifically. This report is
on security in web applications, and the following chapters will focus on this subject
in particular.
In succeeding chapters, we will describe vulnerabilities that are often discovered
in web applications, and the threats that are directed towards them. Subsequent
chapters will describe the development of a web application through requirements
engineering and design. Then parts of the designed application will be implemented,
where the goal is to see how some of the security issues pointed out in this report,
can be solved on the Java platform.
Throughout the entire development of the application, we will make use of the
security guidelines introduced in this chapter. It will be interesting to figure out
to what extent these guidelines may help us focus on security through the develop-
ment process, and wether this approach will contribute to making the system less
vulnerable.
Chapter 3
Vulnerabilities, threats and
countermeasures
This chapter will introduce the most common vulnerabilities and threats that can
be directed towards computer systems today. The overview of threats is constantly
changing, and it is important to keep oneself posted on changes that might occur in
the overview.
The vulnerabilities described in this chapter, will be dealt with one by one, and
countermeasures will be suggested for each one of them. The same goes for the
threats. We take a closer look upon vulnerabilities and threats in order to identify
where security is threatened. We mainly focus on web applications, but some of the
vulnerabilities and threats described, will also apply to software systems in general.
In subsequent chapters in this report, we will design a web application, and point
out where in the application different security breaches may appear, and relate these
to vulnerabilities and attacks presented in this chapter.
3.1 Vulnerabilities
A vulnerability is a weakness that makes a threat possible [20]. There are several
vulnerabilities that may arise when developing web applications. A vulnerability
might be defined as a weakness in the software and/or hardware design that allows
circumvention of the system security.
It is important to identify vulnerabilities that exists, in order to work against
them during the development of applications. Therefore, this section, will describe
the most widespread vulnerabilities, along with countermeasures to counteract them.
3.1.1 Unvalidated input
This vulnerability comes into play when information from web requests is not vali-
dated before it is used by a web application. Attackers can may exploit vulnerabilities
of this kind to attack back end components through a web application. An applica-
tion uses input from HTTP requests to determine how to respond. Attackers may
tamper with any part of the HTTP1 request, namely the URL, query strings, head-
1HTTP defines how messages are formatted and transmitted, and what actions web servers and
browsers should take in response to various commands [44].
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ers, cookies, form fields and hidden fields2. All this to try to bypass the site’s security
mechanisms [43].
Figure 3.1: The invisible security barrier is a conceptual barrier between server and
client. Everything that has crossed this barrier from the client to the server, may be
unsafe [9].
All information sent from the server to the client side, and back again, must
be validated on return to the server side [9]. This is necessary because just about
anything can happen on the client side. When data is sent from the server to the
client, it crosses the invisible security barrier shown in Figure 3.1 [9]. Although
the data was correct when it left from the server, there is no guarantee that the
information is unchanged on return. Everything that has crossed the invisible security
barrier from client to server, may be unsafe. Client side validation is a nice idea for
performance and usability, but it will not contribute to the security of a system at
all.
Countermeasures
The possible consequences of not validating input should not be taken lightly as back
end components may be compromised. A huge number of attacks can be prevented
if the developers simply validate input before using it. Unless a web application
has a strong centralized mechanism for validating all input, vulnerabilities based on
malicious input is likely to occur. It is important to remember that not only may
input come from users, but also from for instance systems or from files.
To complicate the task of possible attackers, it is important that input parame-
ters are converted to their simplest form before they are validated. This will help
avoiding that a masked input slips through filters. Another important aspect is that
all parameters should be checked against a strict format specifying exactly what is
expected input. If a e-mail address is required, one should expect input of a certain
format, that would look something like: someone@something.com. The opposite
2For definitions of these terms, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
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technique, of filtering certain bad input, for instance quotes, is likely to be difficult
to maintain and also unlikely to be a complete coverage of possible bad inputs.
3.1.2 Cross site scripting flaws
One of the most widespread techniques that exploit vulnerabilities of systems where
data is not properly validated, is Cross Site Scripting (XSS). XSS is a weakness in an
application that give attackers the opportunity to plant incorrect information that
to the user seems to come from a serious web site, as shown in Figure 3.2 [9]. This
Figure 3.2: Example of cross site scripting.
vulnerability also makes it possible for an attacker to hijack communication sessions
and thereby pass his or her self off as someone else, with the intent of executing
malicious code. This code might make it possible for the attacker to eavesdrop,
destroy and/or tamper with data on random client machines [24].
A survey conducted by Secode from 2005 [25], points out that 81% of their test
objects were exposed to XSS attacks. The trend is that the use of XSS is decreasing
[24]. But still, vulnerabilities of this kind are discovered all the time. For instance,
in April 2005 an XSS vulnerability in PHP was reported, which could be exploited
by attackers to inject malicious HTML codes [8]. This flaw was due to an input
validation error in the ”index.php” script when handling a specially crafted parame-
ter, which could be exploited by attackers to cause arbitrary scripting code to be
executed by the users browser.
The effects of a XSS attack can vary from simple annoyance to complete account
compromise. The most severe XSS attacks involves disclosure of a users session
cookie3 Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation
3Temporary cookie stored in a computers memory for remembering preferences during a web site
visit, which is destroyed when leaving the site [44], allowing an attacker to hijack the users session
and take control of the victims account.
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of Trojan horses4, redirecting a user to some other page or site, and modifying
presentation of content.
Countermeasures
Figure 3.3: HTML entity coding.
There exist countermeasures one can make use of to avoid XSS. The best way to
prevent a web application from XSS is validating headers, cookies, query strings, form
fields and hidden fields against a rigorous specification of what should be allowed. It
is also a good idea to convert the characters in Table 3.3, in all generated output,
to the appropriate HTML entity coding. The reason why these characters should
be converted is because it may prevent inserted scripts to be transmitted to users
in executable form, and it might thus provide some protection from javascript based
attacks.
3.1.3 SQL injections
The most common type of injection attack, is the SQL injection. Secode reports in
[24] that 31% of the web applications they tested were vulnerable to SQL injections.
This is a result of developers that doesn’t manage to filter input good enough when
it comes from the client headed for the server.
SQL injection is a technique by which attackers can execute SQL statements of
their choice on the back end database by manipulating the input to the application.
An example SQL injection might be directed at login functionality, where the user
needs to provide a username and a password. Suppose that the user enters the
following: Username: Marcus and Password: Safari. This input will then be used to
dynamically build a query that looks something like this: SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE username = ’Marcus’ and password = ’Safari’. This would return to the
application a row from the database with the given values. The user is considered
authenticated if the database returns one or more rows to the application. Now,
suppose that an attacker enters the following input to the login procedure: Username:
’ or 1=1–. The resulting query will look like this: SELECT * FROM Users WHERE
username = ” or 1=1– and password=” The notation – makes the rest of the line a
comment. This means that the query effectively looks like this: SELECT * FROM
Users WHERE username=” or 1=1”. This query will search the database for rows
where either the username is blank or the condition 1=1 is met. Since the latter
always evaluates to true, the query will return all rows of the “Users” table, and the
user is authenticated.
The SQL injection is very dangerous, and almost all platforms are vulnerable
to this attack. To be able to exploit this flaw, the attacker must find a parameter
4An apparently useful and innocent program containing additional hidden code which allows the
unauthorized collection, exploitation, falsification, or destruction of data [44].
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that the web application passes through to a database. The attacker can then trick
the web application to forward malicious commands to the database, by embedding
malicious SQL commands into the content of a parameter. Consequences of SQL
injection are particularly damaging, as an attacker can obtain, corrupt, or destroy
database contents [21].
Countermeasures
To avoid SQL injections certain countermeasures exist. First of all, never pass de-
tailed error messages to the client. Error messages can provide an attacker with
valuable system information [9]. Another countermeasure is to validate input in such
a way, that every possible meta character to a subsystem is identified. In this way,
possible attackers can’t make the necessary inputs to the application to compromise
the system. It is also possible to use the technique of canonicalization5.
3.1.4 Buffer overflow
Buffer overflow is a vulnerability that alter the flow of an application by overwriting
parts of memory. It is a common software flaw that might result in an error condition.
This error condition occurs when data written to memory exceed the allocated size of
the buffer. As the buffer is overflowed, adjacent memory addresses are overwritten,
and might cause the software to fault or crash. By sending carefully crafted input to
a web application an attacker might cause the web application to execute arbitrary
code, and this means that the attacker is effectively taking over the machine.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities have become quite common in the information
security industry and have often plagued web servers. However, they have not been
commonly seen or exploited at the web application layer itself. The primary reason is
that an attacker needs to analyze the application source code or the software binaries.
Since the attacker must exploit custom code on a remote system, they would have
to perform the attack blindly, making success very difficult.
Countermeasures
The countermeasure used to avoid buffer overflow attacks is validation. One should
always check that all input has reasonable length. It doesn’t matter if the input
comes from a user, from files or from another system; all input should always be
checked. In high level languages like Java, Perl, PHP, VBScript and so on, buffer
overflows generally cannot occur [42]. The languages have enforced size restrictions
on arrays, which means that one cannot store something in the arrays unless it fits.
In medium-level languages like C and C++, nothing stops the program from storing
bytes past the end of the array. This requires the developers attention to make the
code safe from possible attacks [9].
3.1.5 Broken authentication and session management
Authentication and session management includes all aspects of handling user authen-
tication and managing active sessions. Authentication is a critical aspect, but solid
5Canonicalization is a way of simplifying encoding. Some sites protect themselves by filtering out
malicious input. The problem is that there are many ways of encoding input. Therefore, parameters
must always be decoded to the simplest form before they are validated, or malicious input may be
masked and can slip past filters [21].
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authentication mechanisms may be undermined by flawed credential management
functions, including forgot password feature, password change, account update, and
other related functions. Because “walk by” attacks, that is attacks where a privileged
user leaves his or her workstation unattended and and attacker exploits this to get
privileged access, are likely for many web applications, all account management func-
tions should require re-authentication even if the user has a valid session identifier
[9].
User authentication in a web application typically involves requiring the user to
provide of information on something he or she knows, like a valid username and
password. Stronger methods of authentication, like biometrics6 (something the user
is), are commercially available, but in most applications they are cost prohibited.
Web applications must establish sessions to keep track of the stream of requests
from each user. HTTP does not provide this capability, so web application must
create it themselves. Account credentials and session tokens needs to be properly
protected, otherwise authentication and session management can be broken. At-
tackers may compromise passwords, keys, session cookies, or other tokens to defeat
authentication restrictions and assume other user’ identities [21].
Unless all authentication credentials and session identifiers are protected with
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) at all times and protected against disclosure from other
flaws, such as cross site scripting, an attacker can hijack a user’s session and assume
their identity.
Countermeasures
Be sure to design a robust and secure authentication and session management scheme
that is consistently enforced. In addition be careful so that user credentials are
properly handled. Some key areas are to control the password storage, they should
be stored in either hashed or encrypted form for protection. Hashed form is preferred
as it is not reversible. Credentials in transit should be protected, for instance by
employing SSL. Concerning the HTTP protocol, authentication and session data
should never be submitted as part of a GET7, POST8 should always be used instead.
3.1.6 Broken access control
Access control is how a web application grants access to content and functions to
some users, and not others. These checks are performed after authentication, and
govern what authorized users are allowed to do. Access control sounds easy enough,
but is hard to implement correctly [32].
It is easy to underestimate the difficulty of implementing reliable access control
mechanisms. Usually the access control rules are inserted different places in the code,
and one cannot create an image of how it all is put together, and this makes it almost
impossible to understand.
Many of these access control schemes are not difficult to reveal and exploit. Once
a flaw is revealed, the consequences of a flawed access control scheme can be devas-
6Security and authentication measures which rely on biological characteristics though to be
sufficiently unique. For example, physical characteristics such as finger prints, retina structure,
voice recognition, or facial recognition [4].
7GET is a request used by the HTTP protocol, and should be used when a client asks for
information [9].
8POST is a request used by the HTTP protocol, that should be used when a client performs
actions where something is permanently changed on the server [9].
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tating. Attackers can then exploit the system to access other users accounts, view
sensitive files, or use unauthorized functions [21].
One specific type of access control problem is that administrative interfaces allow
site administrators to manage a site over the Internet. Due to the administrators
powers to change user rights, data and content on the site, these interfaces are fre-
quently prime targets for attack by both outsiders and insiders.
Countermeasures
Preventing access control from being broken can be done by thoroughly planning
the access control scheme before implementing it. When designing the access control
scheme, always keep in mind the principle of least privilege. It is also useful to review
logs to spot any attempts, or maybe even success’, to break the access control scheme.
3.1.7 Improper error handling
A common problem is when detailed internal error messages such as stack trees,
database dumps, and error codes are displayed to the user. These messages reveal
implementation details that always should be kept secret from outsiders. The mes-
sages can give the user important clues of potential flaws in the site and such messages
are also disturbing to normal users [9]. The attacker can, through improper error
handling, gain detailed system information, deny services, cause security mechanisms
to fail, or crash the server [21].
Frequent errors from the web application may be out of memory, null pointer
exceptions, system call failure, database unavailable, network timeouts and many
more.
Countermeasures
A policy for how to handle errors should be documented, including the types of errors
to be handled, and for each of these what information should be reported to the user,
and what information should be logged. The goal should be to provide a meaningful
error message to the user, diagnostic information to the sites maintainers, and no
useful information to the attacker. Simple error messages should be produced and
logged so that their cause, whether an error in the site or a hacking attempt, can be
reviewed. Error handling should not focus solely on input provided by the user, but
should also include any errors that can be generated by internal components such as
system calls, database queries, or any other internal function.
3.1.8 Insecure storage
Most web applications need to store sensitive information, either in a database or on
a file system somewhere. The information might be passwords, credit card numbers,
account records, or proprietary information. Frequently, encryption techniques are
used to protect this information. Although encryption techniques has become more
easier to implement and use, developers still make mistakes while integrating this
techniques into web applications. They overestimate the protection gained by using
encryption, and forgets to secure other aspects of the site.
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Countermeasures
When you are in need of using encryption, use a public library that has been ex-
posed to public scrutiny and make sure that there are no open vulnerabilities. Do
not develop a new encryption algorithm. One should try to minimize the use of
encryption, and only keep information that is absolutely necessary. For instance,
rather than encrypting and storing credit card information, simply ask the user to
re-enter the numbers [21].
3.1.9 Insecure configuration management
Web server and application server configurations play a key role in the security of a
web application. The servers are responsible for serving content, and invoking appli-
cations that generate content. Some application servers also provide other services
like data storage, directory services9, mail and messaging [42].
Problems with the configuration can be detected by an attacker with readily avail-
able security scanning tools. Once detected, these problems can easily be exploited
and result in total compromise of a web site. Successful attacks can also result in
the compromise of back end systems including databases and corporate networks.
Countermeasures
It is critical to have a strong server configuration standard to secure a web application
[21]. Keeping the server configuration secure requires that the ones responsible are
on the alert. One should pay attention to published security vulnerabilities, and
make sure the system is updated. The latest security patches should be applied, and
one should make sure that configurations, for instance of SSL, are correct.
3.2 Threats
A threat is a potential occurrence that may harm an asset [20]. These occurrences
may be malicious. That is, it might be a deliberate attempt to harm an asset. If
such an action occurs it is called an attack.
There are several different types of attacks. The attacks that will be treated
here are categorized into seven groups; spoofing, tampering data, tap communica-
tion, repudiation, information disclosure, Denial of Services (DoS), and elevation of
privileges. These will all be described in following subsections.
3.2.1 Spoofing
Spoofing is an attempt to access a system by using a false identity. There are several
ways to do this, for example using stolen user credentials or a false IP address [21].
To get a hold of someones user credentials, one may make use of a social engi-
neering10 technique called phishing.
9A directory service organizes content in a directory server into a logical and accessible structure.
10In the realm of computers, the act of obtaining or attempting to obtain otherwise secure data
by conning an individual into revealing secure information. Social engineering might be successful
because its victims innately want to trust other people and are naturally helpful. The victims of
social engineering are tricked into releasing information that they do not realize will be used to
attack a computer network [44].
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Phishing is an expanding problem today, and the kind of phishing that will be
presented here, is getting more and more sophisticated as attackers are starting
to directly address individuals as opposed to addressing the mass marked [22]. The
attackers will send e-mails containing personal information that is already stolen, the
idea being that for instance bank customers will be more likely to give up valuable
information, like the pin-code to their bank card, when presented correct personal
information. The receiver of the e-mail is sent to a page that looks very similar to
the real bank page, by pressing a link in the e-mail. The page is in fact placed on
a bot net11, though. At the malicious page, the victim is asked to provide personal
information. When this is completed, the user is typically sent to his real Internet
bank page and may continue surfing with no worries. The consequence of a phishing
attack varies in accordance with the goal of the attack. Often, economical gain is
the motivation behind a phishing attack, but in-house company information might
also be a target.
Another spoofing technique is IP spoofing. IP spoofing is when an attacker forges
the IP address in packets going from the attacking box, so that the packets appear
to come from an address that should be authenticated when received by the recipient
[42].
In most situations, IP spoofing by itself is not good enough for the attacker to
make a successful attack. For instance, the attacker needs to make sure that the fake
packets are actually routed to the target , and even if packets makes it to the target,
responses are routed to the forged IP address. In order for the forgery to be useful,
the attacker needs to receive the responses. The only real way to accomplish this is
for the attacker to become interposed somewhere on the route between the spoofed
machine and the target.
IP spoofing are, as one can see, difficult to execute. There are tools that largely
automate individual IP spoofing attacks, but the attacker must possess some techni-
cal insight to perform the attacks using the tools available [42].
Countermeasures
There are different countermeasures that may prevent spoofing attacks from happen-
ing. When it comes to phishing, the only way to encounter this problem, is to make
the users aware of the fact that attackers exploit users naivety to get their hands on
sensitive information. To make users more critical to information received in e-mails,
is useful.
As to IP spoofing, one may use countermeasures like strong authentication12 and
encryption to avoid attacks. Simple rules are not to store secrets in plain text, not
pass credentials in plain text over the wire, and protect authentication cookies with
SSL [36].
3.2.2 Tampering data
Tampering is unauthorized modification of data. It usually takes place when the
data is flowing over a network between computers. When data is tampered with, it
11A bot (robot) is a machine that has been compromised and is controlled externally. A bot
program, that has somehow entered the machine opens a port to receive instructions on. Instructions
might be to download new versions of bot software, to send out viruses or spam, or to participate
in denial of service attacks against specified sites. At all times, ten thousands of machines over the
entire world are active in bot nets without the legitimate owners being aware of it [31].
12Strong authentication is described in chapter 1, “Web applications and securiy issues”.
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is compromised [32].
Tampering data is known as an active attack. There are several widespread
tampering techniques. These techniques either involve some modification of the data
stream or the creation of a false stream. The attacks are the masquerade attack,
replay attack, modification-of-messages attack and Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
A masquerade attack takes place when one entity pretends to be a different entity [32].
A replay attack occurs when a message, or part of a message, is repeated to produce
an unauthorized effect [32]. Modification of messages occurs when the content of a
data transmission is altered without detection and results in an unauthorized effect
[32]. An example might be when a message “Allow John Mils to read confidential
files” is changed to “Allow Agatha Anderson to read confidential files”. Denial of
service occurs when an entity fails to perform its proper function [32]. Examples
are generation of extra traffic or messages intended to disrupt the operation of the
network. Denial of service will be treated separately.
Countermeasures
Active attacks are quite difficult to protect from, as it would involve physically pro-
tecting all of the communication facilities and transmission paths at all times. Instead
the goal is to detect them and to recover from any disruption or delays caused by
them. Because detection has a deterrent effect, it may also contribute to prevention
[32]. To prevent attackers from tampering with data, one can use countermeasures
like data hashing, data signing, digital signatures, strong authorization 13, or make
use of a connection-oriented integrity service14.
3.2.3 Tap communication
Tapping of communication is unauthorized eavesdropping, or traffic analysis, of mes-
sages flowing over a network. When data is tapped, it looses integrity [32].
There are several techniques an attacker can make us of for tapping communica-
tion flowing over a network. These techniques are known as passive attacks, more
exactly release of message content or traffic analysis.
Release of message content is when an attacker get his or her hands on information
flowing over the network. Traffic analysis is when an attacker analyzes the stream
of messages sent between users. The attacker tries to extract a pattern from the sent
messages.
Countermeasures
Passive attacks are very difficult to detect because they do not involve any alteration
of data. However, it is feasible to prevent the success of these attacks, usually by
means of encryption. Thus, the emphasis when dealing with passive attacks is on
prevention rather than detection.
13Data hashing, data signing, digital signatures and strong authorization is described in chapter
1, “Web applications and security issues”.
14A connection-oriented integrity service assures that messages are received as sent, with no
duplication, insertion modification, reordering or replays. The destruction of data is also covered
under this service. Thus, the connection-oriented integrity service addresses both message stream
modification and denial of services [44].
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3.2.4 Repudiation
Repudiation is the user, legitimate or not, denying that he or she performed specific
actions or transactions. To prevent repudiation, one should require non-repudiation,
which prevents either sender or receiver from denying a transmitted message [32].
Nonrepudiation is a method of proving either that a user performed an action (such
as enrolling in a stock plan or applying for a car loan), or that the user sent or
received some information at a particular time. This prevents the individual from
fraudulently reneging on a transaction. By comparison, if you purchase an item, you
might have to sign for the item upon receipt. If you decide to renege on the deal,
the vendor can simply show you the signed receipt.
Countermeasures
There are three techniques that are useful when implementing nonrepudiation. Digi-
tal signatures can function as a unique identifier of an individual, much like a written
signature, and therefore prevent repudiation. Confirmation services avoids repudi-
ation because the message transfer agent creates digital receipts to indicate that
messages were sent and/or received. Time stamps contain the date and time a doc-
ument was composed and proves that a document existed at a certain time, and
therefore avoids repudiation.
3.2.5 Information disclosure
Information disclosure is unwanted exposure of private data. A user may, for instance,
view the content of a table or file he or she isn’t supposed to open, or monitor data
passed in plain text over a network [21].
A simple method to disclose information is, according to [9], to rely on the error
supporting system. In some cases, an attacker may provoke an error by inserting
invalid SQL15, and be rewarded with a wealth of information. The information can
be names of tables and columns from the database used by the application. The
attacker can make use of this information to compromise information stored in the
database.
Another way an attacker may proceed to attack a system, is to look for “old”
files. These files might contain revealing information about the system that can give
the attacker unwanted access to private data. An example of this, is if the script file
is called main.asp. Then the attacker can try out “old” file names like for instance
main.bak, main.old or main.asp~ and other previous-version-type extensions.
Countermeasures
Countermeasures that will help prevent information of being disclosed, is to use
strong authorization, strong encryption, secure communication links with protocols
that provide message confidentiality. Also, avoid storing secrets, like passwords, in
plain text, and don’t let “old” files be accessible through the Internet [9].
15Short for Standard Query Language. SQL is a standardized query language for requesting
information from a database. More on SQL on http://www.sql.org.
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3.2.6 Denial of service
During a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to stop legitimate
users from accessing a service, or information. By attacking the users machine, or a
web site the user is trying to access, the attacker might be able to prevent the user
from his or her legitimate access [21].
The most regular form of DoS attack, is to flood the network with useless traffic.
When a user enters an URL into his or her web browser, a request is sent to the
inquired web site to view the page. A web site host machine can only handle a
certain amount of requests simultaneously, and if an attacker successfully overloads
the host machine with requests, the host can’t handle the users requests anymore,
and thus it breaks down [43].
Another attack, is when an attacker locks out a legitimate user by sending invalid
credentials until the system locks the account. This is possible in systems where a user
is only provided a limited number of attempts to enter a valid username/password
combination. If an attacker provides a valid username in combination with an invalid
password a number of times, the account might be locked, and thus the legitimate
user is denied access on his or her return. The attacker could also request a new
password for a user, forcing the legitimate user to access his or her email account to
regain access [21].
An attacker could also flood the system by registering many new users through
a registry form. If the attacker runs a script that generates random input to a
registration form, and this input is accepted and stored in the database, the attacker
might be able to occupy system resources. The registry form, and in worst case the
entire system, will then be unavailable to legitimate users.
Corresponding, an attacker can flood your e-mail account with spam-mail16.
There is always a limit on how many e-mail a user can keep in their mailbox. If
an attacker sends many, or huge, e-mails to a users mailbox, it will prevent the user
from receiving legitimate e-mails [30].
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is when an attacker uses a legitimate users
computer to attack another computer. By exploiting security gaps or vulnerabilities,
an attacker can take control of legitimate users machine. The attacker will then be
able to use the legitimate users computer to send great amounts of data to a web
site, or to spam particular e-mail addresses. The attack is said to be distributed since
the attacker uses several computers to execute the attack [30]. As a DDoS attack
involves multiple machines cooperating on an attack at a specified target, a bot net
will be a excellent tool conducting it. If the bot net is built from machines located
at many different locations this is an advantage for the attacker [31].
Countermeasures
Unfortunately there are no effective countermeasures that will prevent DoS- or DDoS
attacks from happening. But there are ways that will reduce the probability of an
attacker managing to take control over your computer and use it to attack other
computers. Some of these countermeasures are enlisted below, and comes from [30],
[33] and [43].
• Use bandwidth throttling techniques and validate and filter input.
16Spam is electronic junk mail [44].
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• Install and maintain antivirus software and a firewall. The firewall should be
configured to only allow limited amounts of traffic to and from the computer.
• Keep e-mail address’ safe, by not posting it on the Internet in its correct form.
Do not open suspicious e-mails either, and use a spam-filter to filter out spam-
mail.
• If a user forgets his or her password, and requests a new one, the system should
require the user to enter some personal information.
• Use time delays instead of locking users out of their accounts when their pass-
word is entered wrong multiple times.
• Use load balancing techniques to make a potential attack more difficult to
perform. Still it is possible to perform DoS attacks, and especially if sessions
are tied to a particular server. This is why one should make an applications
session data as small as possible and make it somewhat difficult to start a new
session.
3.2.7 Elevation of privileges
Elevation of privileges occurs when an attacker assumes the identity of a more privi-
leged user to gain privileged access to an application. For instance, an attacker might
elevate his or her privilege level to compromise and take control of a highly privileged
and trusted process or account [32].
In security terms, privilege means “permission to do something, but only if there
is some verification of identity” [6]. If a user have the credential, access is granted.
If the user don’t have the credential, access is denied.
Elevation of privilege is not a class of attack as much as it is the process of any
attack. Virtually, all attacks are attempts on performing actions the attacker is not
privileged to do. He or she wants to somehow leverage limited privilege, and turn it
into more elevated privilege.
Most commonly, attackers guess or otherwise obtain the security tokens of a
user who has higher privileges than the attacker. Thus, you’ll often hear the term
“elevation of privileges” sloppily used to mean gaining someone else’s user ID. But
that is just one of the ways to elevate privileges.
The attacker can gain elevated privileges by exploiting physical premises, which
can be done as in the following scenario: A user with privileges walks away from his or
her on-logged computer for a brief moment. An attacker approaches this computer,
uses it, and therefore gains elevated privileges through this machine [42].
Another way the attacker can elevate his or her privileges, is by making use of
a social engineering technique and by this make use of a well-meaning person to
perform the attack [42].
The attacker can also run code on the victim’s machine borrowing the privileges
of one of his system-level applications. The attacker finds a process that is running
with greater privileges than he or she has, and tries to mess it up. As it crashes, the
attacker does something that makes it give its privileges to him or her. Attackers
typically use a buffer overflow17 to accomplish this.
17A buffer overflow attack interrupts the program as it executes, and makes it run additional code
supplied by the attacker. A successful buffer overflow can take an attacker from zero privileges to
total control.
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Countermeasures
To prevent the problem of elevated privileges one should secure physical premises and
make users aware of software engineering (awareness). Other countermeasures are to
follow the principle of least privilege, and use least privileged service accounts to run
processes and access resources. One should also review logs for abnormal activity,
keep up-to-date on patches, have strong passwords, manage settings aggressively and
deploy server security software18.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter vulnerabilities and threats relevant to web applications have been
presented. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses that make a threat possible, and threats
are potential occurrences that may harm an asset. Both groups are presented with
possible countermeasures that will either help avoiding the problem, or decrease the
possibilities of a successful attack. It is important to be aware that there are many
different vulnerabilities and threats to consider when developing a web application.
Even if the application that is developed is a small one, the threat overview it is
exposed to might be just as massive. Another important aspect is the possible
consequences of an attack. They have also been introduced in this chapter. When
developing a computerized system one should try to rate which attacks are most
relevant. The intent of doing this is to be capable of protecting the assets of the
system in the best possible way by employing appropriate countermeasures to avoid
the highest ranking threats.
The next chapter represents the start of our development process, and will begin
by identifying the requirements to the application.
18For definition of Server Security Software, see Appendix A, “Glossary”
Chapter 4
Requirements engineering
This report is on web application security. The best way of showing how to include
security in an application, is by making one. That is what this project will do. The
first step of making a secure web application is to make sure that you design for
security. And before you design anything, you should identify the requirements that
you need your application to fulfill. During this project we will be working according
to the waterfall model, as shown in Figure 4.1 [40]. The waterfall model particulary
expresses the interaction between subsequent phases in a development process. It
is important to be aware that before moving on to a subsequent phase, one should
compare the results obtained to those that are required. In all phases, quality should
be assessed and controlled. The reason why we chose to work by the waterfall model,
as opposed to various alternatives, is that it maps clear cut tasks to each phase. We
have adapted the waterfall model to our project by including a risk analysis in the
requirements engineering part.
This has been done because we wanted to be able to identify vulnerable processes,
and highlight those most relevant in the design. It is thus possible to specifically
design to avoid the most relevant threats.
In this chapter we will be presenting our work with requirements engineering.
The next chapter will contain the design of our application, and after that the im-
plementation will be presented. We will not be reaching the testing phase of the
waterfall model, as this would require a full-grown system. Maintenance is naturally
not treated either. Rather the focus will be set on the design of a secure application
and highlight security vulnerable processes.
This chapter will identify our requirements. First they will be presented in ta-
bles, and then this chapter will use misuse cases to model potential threats to the
application. Misuse cases will shed light on potential attacks and relate them to
functionality in our system.
4.1 System introduction
The application that will be made, will serve the purpose of illustrating vulnera-
ble processes in a system, and indicate exactly what threats are faced by specific
functionality. Important security issues will be highlighted inn all phases of the
development process.
This project will make a web application that is an online ticket ordering system.
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Figure 4.1: The waterfall model shows the systems development process.
There will be tickets to different kinds of arrangements, namely concerts, theaters and
musicals. Customers will be able to order and pay by VISA online, and tickets will be
sent by post. For customers to be able to order tickets they need to be registered in
our customer database, and be logged in to the application. Each order is limited to
a maximum of ten tickets. While logged in the customers may also edit their personal
information and change their password. If you are a new user, it is possible to register
and create a user account. Should a returning customer have forgotten his or her
password, the system will provide a mechanism to reestablish the system identity of
the user. The system has three different kinds of user roles, namely regular users,
who are customers, administrator users, who have extended rights in the system,
including editing events, and super users. Super users have complete editing rights in
the system, including the possibility of creating and deleting administrator accounts.
4.2 Requirements
All requirements to the application have a unique ID, so that one may check each
one explicitly if it is satisfied when the implementation is done. In addition they
will be used as references from the misuse cases in the succeeding section. That is,
they will be used to identify which requirements a misuse case models, and thereby
link requirements to potential security threats. Requirements are organized in ta-
bles. The first column holds user actions and elaboration of requirements, while the
second column is an illustration that we will be able to tick off requirements after im-
plementing the functionality. For now, the second column is left open. As the focus
will be set on security throughout the development process, requirements relevant to
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security have been marked with an asterisk.
The requirements are logically organized in tables identifying system function-
ality. The functionality available is dependent on two factors, if the user is logged
in or not, and what role the user has in our system. The first table represents re-
quirements to what functionality, independent of user role, that should be available
before login. That is, what opportunities a users that browses the page has. The
next three tables identifies functionality that needs to be available to regular users,
administrator users and super users respectively. After user functionality is treated,
database and system requirements will be presented. Network requirements are not
presented, as this is not a relevant topic to this report.
The tables are slightly differently structured depending on their contents. The
first table is in fact a composition of what could have been four tables containing
various functionality before login. These are put together to form Table 4.1, “Before
login”, in which what would have been the headings to each table is presented in
bold letters. Simple user actions are, as in all user functionality tables, presented in
italic writing. Requirements to each of these user actions are attached to them, and
ordered alphabetically. User requirements tables contains a bold header, and user
actions as specified for the compound table with functionality before login. Database
requirements and system requirements do not contain user actions, but rather explicit
requirements the database and the system needs to fulfill. These requirements are
presented in italic letters, and some requirements in the system requirements table
have the same kind of elaboration as user actions in user functionality tables.
4.2.1 Before login
In Table 4.1, “Before login”, four different user actions have been identified. Browse
the page is what any user initially does, and requirement BP identifies what kind
of information should be available. In addition to being able to see information, a
user should be able to register a new user account from this page. This is specified
in requirement RUA, which also consists of five sub actions a user needs to take
to complete registration. RUA1a) identifies what kind of personal information the
application will require to register. This information needs to be kept in a customer
database. As security guideline 2.2.1, “Validate input on the server side” explains,
nothing from the client should be trusted, and input needs to be validated on the
server side. This is expressed in both requirement RUA1b), SLb) and FP1b). These
requirements are marked with an asterisk indicating that they are security critical.
Requirement RUA2a) states that a username should unique. This implies that the
username needs to be checked against other usernames in the database. A user also
needs to select a password, and the system will require that it is according to require-
ment RUA3a) and b). Before completion of the registration, requirement RUA4 and
RUA5 requires the user to sign an electronic personal information protection state-
ment and identify scrambled letters. The latter is a countermeasure to avoid Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks and is marked by an asterisk. This is further treated in the
misuse case part of this chapter. The login functionality has a set of requirements
that have been extracted from the user actions. They are listed before user actions
are presented, and contains general requirements concerning login that are all secu-
rity critical. The login functionality will be using a time delay technique. This is
treated in more detail in the misuse case part of this chapter. The administrators
and super users should log in using a login page with a specified URL, that is hidden
from regular users (SLe)). The password should not be transferred in clear text, and
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Browse the page (BP) Ok?
a) Site information, contact information and a list of upcoming events
should be available.
Register a user account (RUA)
RUA1. User states personal information.
a) First name, last name, address, postal code, post office,
phone number and email should be provided by the user.
*b) Input should be validated on the server side.
RUA2. User selects a username.
a) The username should be unique.
RUA3. User selects a password.
a) Password should contain eight characters.
b) Password should contain small and big characters.
RUA4. User should read and agree to a personal information protection statement.
*RUA5. User should read and state scrambled letters to the application.
Standard login (SL)
*a) A new session should be created.
*b) Input should be validated on the server side.
*c) The user should be taken to another, secure page.
*d) Time delays should be used when a user provides wrong
*e) Administrators and super users should log in from a hidden URL. credentials.
SL1. User states username.
SL2. User states password.
*a) Password should never be transferred in clear text.
Forgot password feature (FP)
FP1. User clicks the “Forgot password?”-link.
*a) Ask the user to supply username and postal code.
*b) Input should be validated on the server side.
*c) Send mail to the users registered email address
with link to a page for resetting the password and a one-time password.
Table 4.1: Requirement table - Before login.
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this is expressed in SL2a) and is a security requirement. The forgot password feature
is the last available functionality identified in this table. This procedure is further
treated in the misuse case part of this chapter.
4.2.2 Regular users
After the user is logged in, different actions are possible depending on the type of
user we are dealing with. Requirements are listed in three tables, Table 4.2 “Regular
users”, Table 4.3 “Administrator users” and Table 4.4 “Super users”. First we will
concern ourselves with regular users. These are the users that have no special rights
in the system. All users will be granted these rights when registering in our database.
Regular users (RU) Ok?
RU1. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
b) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when processing an order.
RU2. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
RU3. Order ticket(s).
a) The user should be able to order tickets.
b) The order should be limited by ten tickets.
c) Event headline and number of tickets ordered should be confirmed by user.
d) Address, postal code and post office should be confirmed by user.
*e) Payment information should be entered.
f) User repudiation should be avoided.
RU4. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated.
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of
15 minutes without user action.
Table 4.2: Requirement table - Regular users.
Regular users functionality requirements are identified in Table 4.2, “Regular
users”. The first requirement RU1 states that the user should be able to edit his or
her personal information, either when logged in, or when processing an order. RU2
opens the opportunity for the user to change the password. RU3 is the main user
action, that is, order ticket(s). This action consists of several sub requirements. The
system will require that an order is limited by ten tickets (RU3b)), and that the user
confirms the number of tickets ordered and which event the order concerns (RU3c)).
The user should also confirm that his or her registered address is correct (RU3d)).
RU3e) requires payment information to be entered to the system each time an order is
processed. This is due to strict requirements as to storage of this kind of information
and it is a security critical requirement. At last, it is important that repudiation is
avoided (RU3f)). RU4 requires that logout is available. This functionality is equal
for all user roles, and will be repeated in the administrator users table and the super
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users table. The logout functionality results in session invalidation (RU4a)) and a
confirmation message to the user of the application (RU4b)). If a user choose to end
his or her session by closing the browser, then it should be equivalent to pressing
the logout button (RU4c)), only a confirmation message is not necessary. If a user
session is inactive for a period of 15 minutes, logout should happen automatically
(RU4d)), and a message to the user stating that he or she was logged out due to
timeout should be provided. This is also a security critical requirement.
4.2.3 Administrator users
Administrator users (AU) Ok?
AU1. Edit events.
a) Should be able to add event(s).
b) Should be able to change event properties.
c) Should be able to remove event(s) by hiding them.
AU2. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
AU3. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
AU4. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated.
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of
15 minutes without user action.
Table 4.3: Requirement table - Administrator users.
These users will have extended system rights compared to regular users. The
requirements are available in Table 4.3. An administrator user should be able to edit
events (AU1)). This implies adding events (AU1a)), changing event properties like
for instance dates (AU1b)) and removing events from the page available to regular
users (AU1c)). The administrator user should not be able to delete events, as this
will be a task left for super users. AU2 states that administrator users should be
able to edit their personal information when logged in to the system. AU3 gives the
administrator user the opportunity to change his or her password. AU4, logout, is
similar to regular users logout, RU4.
4.2.4 Super users
Super users have full system rights. Requirements are enlisted in Table 4.4. Require-
ment SU1, on editing events, is similar to the same functionality for administrator
users AU1, the only difference being that the super users are able to completely
delete an event from the system (SU1c)). Requirements SU2 and SU3 are similar to
corresponding administrator user functionality, and is thus not repeated. SU4 states
that a super user should be able to create an administrator user account, while SU5
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Super users (SU) Ok?
SU1. Edit events.
a) Should be able to add event(s).
b) Should be able to change event properties.
c) Should be able to delete event(s).
SU2. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
SU3. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
SU4. Should be able to register administrator user account.
SU5. Should be able to edit administrator user account.
SU6. Should be able to delete administrator user account.
*SU7. Should be able to check the log.
SU8. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated.
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of
15 minutes without user action.
Table 4.4: Requirement table - Super users.
a super user should be able to delete an administrator account (SU6)). SU7 regards
the log, which can be a tool to help detect misuse of the system. The super user
should be able to check the log. This requirement is marked with an asterisk, since
it is security critical. SU8, logout, is similar to RU4, and will not be treated.
4.2.5 The database
Database requirements (DBR) Ok?
*DBR1. Passwords should be stored encrypted.
DBR2. The database should be available 90% of the time.
DBR3. The database should be able to cope with simultaneous access.
Table 4.5: Requirement table - Database requirements.
The database will need to be consistent at all times. It will have to work according
to ACID1 properties. Database requirements are expressed in Table 4.5, “Database
requirements”. The first requirement regards password storage. According to se-
curity guidelines 2.1.5. “Defense in depth”, and 2.1.6, “Secure the weakest link”,
passwords should not be stored in clear text, but rather encrypted (DBR1)). This is
a security critical requirement. Requirement DBR2) concerns availability. Keeping
the database available at all times is neither realistic nor necessary. It will have to
1These four properties are considered to be key transaction processing features of database
management systems. Without them, the integrity of the database cannot be guaranteed. The four
properties are atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability [44].
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be unavailable during for instance repairs, and this is not critical as this application
is not a critical one. DBR2 states that the database should be available 90% of the
time. DBR3) states that simultaneous access not should cause trouble in the system.
Simultaneous access needs to be synchronized so that for instance database updates
are under control.
Administrators should make sure that there is always a backup of the database.
4.2.6 System requirements
System requirements (SR) Ok?
SR1. Availability.
a) The system needs to be available 90% of the time.
SR2. Scalability.
a) The system should be able to handle 100 events simultaneously.
*SR3. Encryption.
a) As of the login session, all succeeding communication should be encrypted.
*SR4. Caching.
a) Sensitive data should not be cached.
*SR5. Input validation.
a) Headers, cookies, query strings, form fields and hidden
fields needs to be validated on the server side.
SR6. Log.
a) The system should keep track of actions and transactions
with a log.
Table 4.6: Requirement table - System requirements.
In addition to functional requirements, system requirements are presented in Ta-
ble 4.6 “System requirements”. The same availability requirement as for the database
goes for the system in total, it should be available 90% of the time (SR1a)). The
system should also be able to handle 100 events simultaneously (SR2a)). Encryp-
tion should provide confidentiality of data by providing a way that the server and
client can exchange encrypted messages that cannot be understood by anybody else.
As we will be using the Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the login session will also be
encrypted. As of the login session, all communication should, according to security
guideline 5.3,“Encrypt communication lines” be encrypted (SR3a)). This is a secu-
rity critical requirement marked with an asterisk . Caching is an important topic.
Caching of sensitive data, for instance credit card information, might be dangerous
as attackers can view for instance the Temporary Internet Files folder in Internet
Explorer. Sensitive data should not be cached (SR4a)), according to 2.2.3, “Limit
cache usage”. This requirement is also marked with an asterisk, and is relevant to
security. As have been mentioned before, input validation is extremely important.
All kinds of input should be validated. This is expressed in requirement SR5a), ac-
cording to 2.1.1, “Validate input”, which is marked with an asterisk, since it is a
security requirement. The system is required to keep a log (SR6)).
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4.2.7 Error handling
Error handling requirements (EHR) Ok?
EHR1. System error should be reported to super user.
*EHR2. System error should present information page to regular user.
EHR3. User error should result in a constructed error page being return to the user.
Table 4.7: Requirement table - Error handling requirements.
It is of great importance that errors and exceptions in an application are treated
correct. This is also according to security guideline 2.1.2, “Fail securely”. The
requirements are presented in Table 4.7, “Error handling requirements”. For security
it is important that errors are classified and reported to a super user so that they can
be fixed. This is expressed in requirement EHR1. The user should not be provided a
too detailed error message as this might be something an attacker can take advantage
of. This is expressed in requirement EHR2 and is marked with an asterisk to indicate
the connection to security. EHR3 expresses that a users error should return an error
message to the client side.
4.3 Misuse cases
To model our requirements, we will make use of misuse cases2 to point out where se-
curity might be threatened. The fascinating thing about misuse cases is the way that
they relate functionality and threats to each other in a visual and easily surveyable
manner.
Briefly, misuse cases are use cases that model both functionality in a system and
the system areas where security is exposed to threats. It also implies what effort one
should make to reduce, or even better, avoid, any risks present.
Following are the modeled misuse cases. They are organized in the same fash-
ion as the requirements presented earlier in this chapter, and the focus is on both
functionality and security. The textual description that succeeds each of them, fo-
cuses on how to prevent the security risks the system faces. The various threats are
identified in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures”. This chapter
also presents countermeasures. Some details about threats and attacks are repeated
here, but for an in depth description of attacks and countermeasures we once again
refer the readers to chapter 3.
Some misuse cases are more complex than others, and those who consist of com-
pound actions of interest are decomposed to get a closer look at the threat we are
facing. One misuse case is particularly complex, but it is left that way because it pro-
vides a survey of functionality available before login, and also illustrates that there
are a number of threats facing our application.
4.3.1 Before login
The first misuse case, shown in Figure 4.2, is an overview of functionality that faces
the user when he or she first browses the page. The first misuse case focuses solely
on Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second misuse case shows pretty much the
2Appendix B gives an introduction to both use cases and misuse cases.
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same functionality, but related to different threats. (Browse the page is not repeated
in the second misuse case, as it is only threatened by DoS attacks.) Both of these
first misuse cases are surveys of available functionality for all users browsing the
page, independent of user role, or even if the user is registered in the system. The
misuse cases ties together a lot of functionality, and will be decomposed to examine
the login procedure and the register user account functionality in more details in
separate misuse cases. The first misuse cases correspond to requirements in Table
4.1, “Before login”.
Misuse case - Before login, DoS
Figure 4.2: Before login - DoS.
First of all, every user that accesses the web site will be able to browse information
presented on the page. The information available is for instance event-, contact- and
site information (according to requirement BP, browse the page.). Should too many
users browse the page at once, or an attacker flood the network with useless traffic, it
is a possibility that the network could be compromised due to bandwidth shortage.
This is illustrated in the top of the figure, and countermeasures to flood the network
attacks are identified as for instance bandwidth throttling techniques in chapter 3,
“Vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures”.
The page that welcomes the users is also the one that provides the opportunity to
register a new user account (requirement RUA, register user account). This function-
ality might be offer to a flood system attack. The difference from a flood the network
attack is presented in chapter 3. Both are defined as DoS attacks, and flood the
system is a reference to an attack that compromises the system due to an overload
of system capacity, as opposed to flood the network, which is an attack on network
capacity. The main intent of using scrambling of letters as a countermeasure of a
flood system attack is to avoid automated attacks. The idea is that the user have
to enter a set of numbers and letters from a small window that is not readable by a
computer script; only by the human eye. Thus an automated attack is not feasible.
The login procedure and forgot password feature might be victim to another type
of DoS attack, lock out legitimate user. This attack locks out a legitimate user by
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providing invalid credentials until the system locks the account. To prevent it our
login functionality will use a time delay (required in SLd), standard login). The
intent of this time delay is that, instead of shutting down a user account after a
user has provided wrong username and password combination a number of times,
the system will slow down. That way, an attacker is not in a position to shut down
user accounts by repeatedly providing fake input.
To prevent a lock out legitimate user attack on the forgot password feature, one
may use personal information (in accordance with requirement FPa), forgot Password
feature). This variant of DoS, as presented in chapter 3 sends a forgot password
requests on a specific account. This may result in the user being locked out of the
system because the password has been reset. It is circumvented by asking the user
to provide some personal details in order to go through with the forgot password
procedure. Our system will, as mentioned during requirements specification, ask for
post office and username.
When we move on to the second misuse case concerning functionality available
before login, Figure 4.3, we see that several functionalities are potential victims of
more threats.
Before login - miscellaneous
Figure 4.3: Before login- miscellaneous.
The second misuse case is fairly complex, and it might seem overwhelming, but
it certainly illustrates that even a rather limited application is exposed to a lot
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of different threats. Some of these threats are collective terms, and these are the
ones that will be decomposed to show which part of the threat is relevant to our
application. Register user account, login functionality and forgot password might be
victim of a SQL-injection attack (presented in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats
and countermeasures”) unless input is validated. Input is required to be validated
on the server side according to requirements RUAb), register user account, SLb),
standard login and FPb), forgot password feature. These functionalities are also
possible targets for launching of information disclosure attacks. This kind of attacks
are avoided by various measures identified in chapter 3 for example to avoid storing
secrets, that is passwords, in plain text (requirement DBR1, database requirements).
Finally, register user account is connected to both tampering data and tap com-
munication attacks. These attacks are compound, and the relevant parts of this
threat are treated in the decomposition misuse case, presented later in this section.
The same goes for login, which is, in addition to tampering data and tap commu-
nication attack, also threatened by spoofing. A closer look at the login procedure is
provided in the next misuse case.
The threat elevation of privilege, in this setting, concerns a user being able to
log on as a more privileged user, the countermeasures being to follow the principle
of least privilege and review the log for abnormal activity (the system is required to
keep track of actions and transactions by use of a log in requirement SR5, system
requirements.).
4.3.2 Login
Figure 4.4: Misuse case, Log in.
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The login misuse case, in Figure 4.4, shows a more detailed view of the rela-
tion between login functionality and possible threats. It shows that phishing and IP
Spoofing are possible forms of spoofing attacks. Phishing is the kind of attack where
an attacker sends e-mails asking the user to provide personal information because
of some problem in the application. The only way to prevent it is awareness among
users. IP spoofing is prevented by encryption (requirement SR3, system require-
ments). Encryption is also the means to prevent from release of message contents,
which is classified as a tap communication attack. This is the tap communication
attack that is relevant for our application, and later on tap communication will not
be decomposed. Release of message contents is implied. The other tap communica-
tion attack, traffic analysis, will not be discussed. The last modeled threat to the
login procedure is a tampering data attack, namely masquerade attack. It is defined
as a tampering attack as it creates a false stream when a user logging on as a differ-
ent user than himself. To conquer a masquerade attack, chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities,
threats and countermeasures” identifies several encryption techniques.
4.3.3 Register user account
Figure 4.5: Register user account.
This misuse case, Figure 4.5, shows a decomposition of the register user account
procedure. Release of message contents is, as in the login procedure, prevented by
encryption. This is the kind of tap communication attack that is interesting in this
matter. The modification of message threat is a subgroup of tampering data attacks,
and it is prevented by the use of digital signatures. Digital signatures was presented
in chapter 1, “Web applications and security issues”.
Regular users
The misuse case in Figure 4.6 shows what a regular user is capable of doing when
logged into the system. The actions he or she is capable of, are in accordance with
Table 4.2, “Regular users”. Of course, a user have to be able to order ticket(s) (re-
quirement RU3). This is the most complicated task and the tamper data threat will
be decomposed in the succeeding misuse case. Order ticket(s) is also connected to a
tap communication threat, but this threat will not be decomposed, as mentioned be-
fore, because whenever this attack is described, release of message content is implied.
Repudiation occurs when a user denies performing actions or transactions. This is
critical, especially during ordering of tickets, and must thus be avoided (requirement
RU3f)). Countermeasures are identified in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and
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Figure 4.6: Misuse case, Regular Users.
countermeasures”. In addition to order ticket(s), a regular user might edit his or her
personal information (requirement RU1). This functionality is similar to register user
account, and is therefore not decomposed. Instead, we refer to the previous misuse
case shown in Figure 4.5. The last thing that a user is capable of doing, is logout
(requirement RU4). This is threatened by elevation of privilege as a privileged user
might leave his or her workstation without logging out, and thus open an opportunity
for a less privileged user to use his or her account. In chapter 3 this is defined as
a elevation of privilege on account of exploiting physical premises. The misuse case
Figure 4.7: Misuse case, Order ticket(s).
in Figure 4.7 is a more detailed view of threats connected to ordering ticket(s). A
digital signature will be used to avoid replay attack.
4.3.4 Administrator users
The next misuse case, shown in Figure 4.8 illustrates administrator users possible
actions related to possible threats. The functionality is in accordance with Table 4.3,
“Administrator users”. Edit personal information (requirement AU2) and logout (re-
quirement AU4) is equivalent to the same functionality in the regular users misuse
case. Edit events (requirement AU1) will be decomposed to have a closer look at
tamper data threats. In this misuse case, in Figure 4.9, edit event(s) is decomposed.
Possible actions are add event(s), edit event(s) and remove event(s). All are possi-
ble victims of the same threats, namely the tampering data threats modification of
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Figure 4.8: Misuse case, Administrator Users.
messages and masquerade. Masquerade would imply that an attacker is capable of
logging on as another user, and then add, edit or remove events from the system.
Remove is not the same as deleting events, the administrator user is restricted to only
remove events from the system, in the sense of making them unavailable to users.
This was also mentioned in the requirements part of this chapter. There is only one
countermeasure identified, and this is encryption, which is a collective term. This is
treated in more detail in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures”.
Figure 4.9: Misuse case, Edit events.
4.3.5 Super users
This misuse case, 4.10, is in accordance with Table 4.4, “Super users”, and edit per-
sonal information (requirement SU2) and logout (requirement SU8) is in accordance
with previous misuse cases and it will not be treated further here. Edit event(s)
(requirement SU1) is also pretty much the same, only a decomposition would show
that a super user is in fact capable of actually deleting an event from the system,
not only hide it as a administrator user is capable of. The super user is capable
of checking the log (requirement SU7). This is threatened by a tap communication
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attack. As usual, this attack implies release of message content, not traffic analysis.
Figure 4.10: Misuse case, Super users.
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4.4 Risk analysis
Figure 4.11 is an illustration of the relationship between threats and risk. We will
be treating all the threats we have encountered during misuse case modeling in this
chapter, and range them to find which ones are most urgent in our application. We
have chosen to do this at this stage of the process to open the opportunity to design
with respect to relevant threats.
Figure 4.11: The relation between threat and risk.
At the end of this modeling process we will be left with a list of the relevant
threats, ordered by the risk that they pose to our application.
A simple way to rank the threats would be to use this formula: Risk = Probability
* Consequence. To achieve a more differentiated ranking we have chosen to apply a
more fine grained method that takes more elements into account. We will be using
Microsofts DREAD model [35], that contains five aspects to consider. Each threat
identified relevant to the application will be evaluated and given a score on each of
these five. DREAD is an abbreviation, and the content of the elements we will be
evaluating is expressed below. Each element have been related to the more traditional
aspects of risk analysis, that is, either the consequences of a risk, or the probability
of it occurring.
Damage potential: How great is the damage if the vulnerability is exploited? This
element concerns the consequence of an attack. A threat that would result in
the attacker subverting the system, that is for instance get full trust authoriza-
tion, run as administrator or be able to upload content is considered a high
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ranking threat. A threat that could result in leakage of trivial information is a
low ranked threat.
Reproducibility: How easy is it to reproduce the attack? A high ranked threat
would be possible to reproduce within a short time interval, while a low ranked
threat is difficult to reproduce even with knowledge of the security hole. This
element considers the probability of an attack.
Exploitability: How easy is it to launch an attack? If a novice programmer would
be able to make the attack quickly it needs to be considered a high ranked
threat, whereas if the attack requires a highly skilled person with an in-depth
knowledge every time to be exploited, it would be considered a low ranged
threat. This element concerns the probability of an attack.
Affected users: As a rough percentage, how many users are affected? If all users
are affected it is a high ranked threat. If only a very small percentage of users
is affected it would be ranked as low. This element concerns the consequence
of an attack.
Discoverability: How easy is it to find the vulnerability? If it is highly avail-
able, that is, published information explains the attack and the vulnerability is
found in a commonly used feature it would be considered a high ranked threat,
whereas if the threat exploits a vulnerability that is not publicly known, or it
is unlikely that users will work out the damage potential, it is considered a low
ranked threat. This element concerns the probability of an attack.
Each of these elements have been rated with a high (3)-, medium (2) or low (1) score
when evaluating each of the threats identified in this chapter. This indicates that
each threat will end up with a total score in the range between 5 and 15. An overall
rating will classify a total score 12-15 as a high risk, a total of 8-11 as a medium risk
and a total of 5-7 as low risk. Our threats, ranked in decreasing order on account of
their score on the various elements presented is showed in Figure 4.12. Each one has
been given a unique number, for simpler reference.
High risk threats
As one can see, there are three attacks that are all rated to a score 12 out of 15
possible. They are therefore considered as high risk threats. R1, Flood the system
was evaluated to have a low damage potential, high reproducibility and it is high
on affected users. It is also easily available, but requires a skilled programmer. As
it is a DoS attack it is hard to completely avoid it, but some countermeasures are
identified in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures”. R2, Phishing
also has a high ranking, it is given a medium score on damage potential, as users of
the application might be fooled into disclose of their personal information, it is an
attack that is easily reproduced, and a novice programmer could carry it out, affected
users is a medium as probably only a group of users will fall short to this attack.
Discoverability is rated a medium. R3, SQL-injection has a medium score on damage
potential as a successful attack will probably result in leakage of sensitive information.
This attack might be reproduced easily, but it requires a skilled programmer to
accomplish. Affected users is rated high, as if the database is compromised all users
personal information is compromised as well. Discoverability is a medium.
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Figure 4.12: DREAD diagram.
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Medium risk threats
R4, Flood the system has a total score of 11 points, which inflicts an overall rat-
ing as a medium risk. Damage potential is low, reproducibility and exploitability
is medium, affected users is high. Discoverability is high. R5, Information disclo-
sure has a total score of 10 points, which ranges the attack as a medium risk to the
application. It is set to a medium on damage potential as it could possibly reveal
sensitive system information. The attack may easily be reproduced, but requires a
skilled programmer to launch. That is, high on reproducibility, medium exploitabil-
ity. Affected users is set to low, as it is system information that is compromised.
Discoverablilty is medium. R6, IP spoofing is in a group of three threats that has all
been given a total of nine points, and they are therefore considered medium risks.
IP spoofing has a medium damage potential, it is hard to reproduce (low score) and
it requires a skilled programmer to conduct (medium score on exploitability). It will
probably affect a small percentage of users (low score on affected users), but is is
high on discoverability. R7, Release of message content also has an overall score of
nine points. It has a medium damage potential, but it is hard to reproduce and
requires a skilled programmer. Affected users is set to medium, and discoverability
is set to high. R8, Replay has an overall score of nine points. It is medium ranged
on damage potential and reproducibility, it is hard to accomplish and is thus ranked
as a high on exploitability. Affected users is also low, but discoverability might be
high. R9, Elevation of privilege has a total score of eight points. For this threat,
the damage potential is great, but it is rather hard to conduct (Low score on repro-
ducibility and exploitability). Affected users is a medium, and discoverability is low.
R10, Masquerade has a medium damage potential, but it is low on reproducibility,
exploitability and affected users as it is an attack that is hard to conduct and it does
not affect the majority of users. Discoverability is high. R11, Lock out legitimate
user has a total score of seven points, which leaves the threat ranged as a low risk.
It has a low score on all elements, except from discoverability. R12, Modification of
message also has an overall score of seven points. It is medium on damage potential
and discoverability, on other elements it is ranked low. The last threat, R13, Repudi-
ation has a overall score of six points. It is an attack that is complicated to conduct,
and it will probably not affect a lot of users, but it is medium on discoverability.
All in all, although all these threats are indeed relevant to the design of our
application, we will be giving the most attention to the threats that have been ranked
most urgent. That is, threats that have a total score that ranges them as high risks
will be taken more into account in the design phase than less urgent threats.
4.5 Summary
This chapter concludes the requirements engineering phase of the development process.
Various requirements, that is, functional requirements, system requirements and
database requirements have been identified, and misuse cases have been employed
to relate system functionality to potential threats. At the end of this chapter a risk
analysis has been conducted to range the threats relevant, so that when moving on
to the design phase, one may take into consideration the most urgent ones.
Chapter 5
Design
As our requirements were identified in the previous chapter, and a risk analysis
showed which threats are most likely to inflict our application, we will now design
with respect to this. Vulnerable parts of the application will be highlighted. As we
have pointed out earlier, in chapter 2, “Security guidelines”, it is important to keep
ones mind focused on security at all times in the development process. As we are
entering the design phase, we will identify specific processes in the application that
will be critical.
This chapter will contain a description of our chosen architecture, a brief intro-
duction to the technologies that is to be used in the implementation, and a design of
the application.
5.1 Architecture
Figure 5.1: The JSP Model 2 Architecture.
Figure 5.1 shows a high level view of the architecture we have chosen for the
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application. It is called a Model-View-Controller (MVC) architecture, and its intent
is to separate what the user sees from the logic of the application. It defines a
separation of concerns in an application where the model defines the internal data
structures of the system, the view defines how the model is rendered to the user, and
the controller performs the actual actions in the program that affect the model [17].
In our design, the view is the graphical user interface (GUI) that the user interacts
with. The controller is where the business logic is placed, and the database will be
referred to as the model. This architecture is related to our security guidelines in
chapter 2, as it realize the guideline 2.1.8, “Compartmentalization”. Breaking the
system into units, and isolating code that has security privileges on the server, will
minimize the amount of damage if someone attacks a part of the application. This
architecture also refers to the guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”, as the controller will
serve as a choke point to handle requests.
From the figure, one can see that the view is called JSP, the controller Java
Servlet, and the model JavaBean. Before presenting our design in more detail, we
would like to introduce the technologies that will be used later on in the implemen-
tation phase.
5.2 Technologies
One of the goals in this report is to design a web application on the Java platform.
When using the MVC architecture, we need to interweave several techniques, for in-
stance an application server and a database. There are several different technologies
to choose from, but we have chosen those that are widespread and free of charge.
This is according to the security guideline 2.1.4, “Use and reuse trusted compo-
nents”. Doing this, it is important to emphasize that components must be developed
by trusted third parties, tested out by multiple users, and have no documentation
indicating weaknesses. In addition, choosing popular technologies, makes it easier to
find answers to problems along the way.
5.2.1 Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML)
HTML is a static authoring language used to create documents on the web. It defines
the structure and layout of a web document by using a variety of tags and attributes.
HTML looks a lot like old-fashioned typesetting code, where you surround a block of
text with code that indicate how it should appear. Additionally, in HTML you can
specify that a block of text, or a word, is linked to another file on the Internet [44].
When creating a web application on the Java platform, we use the JavaServer
Pages (JSP) technology. JSP is Java code embedded in a Hyper Text Markup Lan-
guage (HTML) page using special tags.
5.2.2 The Java Platform
The Java platform is a software-only platform that runs on top of other hardware-
based platforms. Because hardware-based platforms vary in their storage, memory,
network connection, and computing power capabilities, specialized Java platforms
are available to address applications development for those different environments
[11].
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Using the Java platform makes the software developed less vulnerable to the
buffer overflow attack described in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and counter-
measures”. Scripting languages such as Java are less exposed to this threat, as it use
dynamic memory management to allocate space for variables. This does not mean
that input lengths should be ignored when creating a web application on the Java
platform. It is still possible that these variables could be passed to other programs
that are susceptible to buffer overflows [12].
5.2.3 Java programming language
The Java programming language lets you write programs that run in the browser,
from the desktop, on a server, or on a consumer device. Java programs are run on,
and interpreted by, another program called the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Rather
than running directly on the native operating system, the program is interpreted by
the JVM for the native operating system. This means that any computer system
with the JVM installed can run a Java program regardless of the computer system
on which the application was originally developed [11].
5.2.4 JavaServer Pages (JSP)
The JavaServer Pages (JSP) technology is an open, freely available specification
developed by Sun Microsystems. JSP pages are written on the Java platform, and is
therefore platform independent.
The fact that Java is platform independent, means that JSP pages does not tie you
to any specific web server or operating system [14], which is a great advantage when
it comes to security. All security functionality implemented in JSP-files, will function
in any web browser. If you would use for instance JavaScript1, there are several web
browsers that won’t understand it. It is only supported by recent browsers from
Netscape and Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE), though MSIE supports only a
subset. If security functionality is to be implemented using JavaScript, there is no
guarantee that the security efforts will work properly.
A JSP page contains both regular HTML, and also special JSP elements that
allows the server to insert dynamic content into a web page. JSP elements can be
used for a wide variety of purposes, such as retrieving information from a database
or registering user preferences. JSP uses tags to allow for instance embedded code
in an HTML page, session tracking, and database connection [2].
When JSP pages are requested by the user, the server executes the JSP elements,
merges the result with the static parts of the page, and sends the dynamically com-
posed page back to the browser [23]. What happens is that the pages are compiled
into Java Servlets2 and loaded into memory the first time they are called, and exe-
cuted for all subsequent calls.
There are several advantages about JSP. Speed and scalability are two of them
[14]. In addition, JSP has its own embedded mechanism for handling runtime ex-
ceptions. You can provide your own exception handling using JSP, but it is hard to
1JavaScript is a scripting language developed by Netscape to enable web authors to design
interactive sites. Although it shares many of the features and structures of the full Java language,
it was developed independently. JavaScript can interact with HTML source code, enabling web
authors to spice up their sites with dynamic content [44].
2Servlets are programs written in Java that run on a web server and can produce dynamic pages
[44].
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anticipate all situations. By making use of the embedded “page” directives “error”
attribute, it is possible to forward an uncaught exception to an error handling JSP
page for processing [27]. This embedded error handling functionality, makes JSP
supported by the security guideline 2.1.2, “Fail securely”.
5.2.5 JavaBeans
As a component of the JSP architecture, one may use JavaBeans (often referred
to as beans), technology. A JavaBean is a Java servlet that follows certain coding
conventions so that it can be used as a component in a larger application [2]. A bean
is often used in JSP as the container for the dynamic content to be displayed on a
web page. A bean is always created by a server process and given to the JSP page,
that is, it handles business logic as a part of the controller.
A JavaBean can act as a choke point where all critical security operations are
lead through it. This is according to security guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”.
5.2.6 Tomcat
An application server is a server program in a computer within a distributed network,
that executes applications when requested by other clients [44]. It also stores business
logics and the business models classes of applications.
We have installed the Tomcat-server from the Apache Jakarta Project in the
application tier. This is an application server developed by a trusted third party,
and tested out by multiple users. This is according to the security guideline 2.1.4,
“Use and reuse trusted components”.
5.2.7 eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a standard for creating markup languages
which describe the structure of data. It is not a fixed set of elements like HTML,
but rather it is a metalanguage, or a language for describing languages [47].
As for security, there exist a project on XML security by the Apache Jakarta
project, that presents solutions for how to handle security issues like encryption and
digital signatures for XML in interoperability with Java [47].
5.2.8 MySQL
In the a three-tired application, as presented in chapter 1, “Web applications and
security issues”, we need a database in the data tier. MySQL is a multithreaded,
multi-user, SQL (Structured Query Language) relational database server. MySQL is
most commonly used for web applications and for embedded applications, and has
become a popular alternative to proprietary database systems because of its speed
and reliability [44].
As of security, MySQL is ACID3 compliant, it can establish a secure connection
with a remote server using OpenSSL4, which means that it is possible to establish a
secure communication line between the database and the applications server [15]. It
is also possible to encrypt data values in MySQL using built-in encryption functions
[18].
3For definition of ACID, see “Glossary” in Appendix A
4For definition of OpenSSL, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
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Java Database Connectivity (JDBC)
When making a web application like ours, we need a tool that will handle the com-
munication between the JSP pages and the database.
The Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) is a Java API5 that enables Java pro-
grams to execute SQL statements [44]. This allows Java programs to interact with,
for instance, the chosen MySQL database.
Some of the technologies introduced in this section, will be referred to later on in
this chapter. Others will we not be getting into before the implementation in the
following chapter. But now, we will move on to presenting our design.
The design is divided into parts in accordance with our architecture. This means
that we will be presenting the design in three parts, the model, the view and the
controller. Each of the three parts will have contain a subsection describing solutions
to important security issues. We will be drawing sequence diagrams to show the data
flow between the three application tiers, namely the presentation tier (web browser),
application tier (view and controller) and the data tier (model).
The application we are developing will be designed with regard to security. The
previous chapter, “Requirement engineering”, provided a basis from which the work
in this chapter will proceed.
Some of the requirements, especially the security critical ones, marked with an
asterisk in the requirement tables, will be referred during the design. The misuse
cases showed where the system is vulnerable to attacks. Countermeasures identified,
will be refined according to our choices of technologies. Throughout the design, we
will keep on stressing where security is threatened, and design the system in such
way, that the threats identified will be prevented. Those threats that has the highest
rank in our risk analysis in Figure 4.12, is given high priority.
5.3 The Model
We start off introducing the design of our model, namely our MySQL database, which
defines the internal data structures of the system.
Figure 5.2 shows the tables in the applications database, and the relations between
them. The database has six tables, namely “Person”, “Order”, “Event”, “Users”,
“User roles”, and “Roles”.
The “Person” table contains personal information on all users of the system, for
instance full name, username (userID) and password. To fulfill the security guideline
2.1.5, “Defense in depth”, and according to requirement DBR1, the password must
be stored encrypted in the database.
The “Order” table contains information about every order made by users in the
system. It holds information on who order the tickets, to what event, how many
tickets was ordered, when did the order take place and did the payment go through.
The “Event” table contains information on events, like type of events, descrip-
tions, where it is, and how many tickets there are left. The “TypeOfEvent” element
should have the value 1, 2, or 3, according to which type of event it is. 1 is concert,
2 is theater and 3 is musicals. In addition, there is a row with a binary value called
“Visible”. In this table the value 1 states that an event should be visible to users,
5Short for Application Program Interface. A set of routines provided in libraries that extends a
language’s functionality.
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Figure 5.2: The Model is the database.
and 0 that it should not. This row is necessary to satisfy requirement AU1c), that
administrators and super users should be able to hide events.
The “Users”, “‘User roles”, and “Roles”, are tables that should be used when
authorizing users to the system. If the users role is set to preLogin, the user have
no privileges but to browse the page. If the role is set to user, the user have regular
user privileges,. If the user role is set to administrator, the user gets privileges as a
system administrator. If the user role is superuser, the user gets super user privileges
in the system.
Security
The database should have a secure connection to the application server to avoid
information disclosure, described in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and coun-
termeasures”. If the application server and the database both lies within the same
closed, secure environment, the communication between the two tiers will not be a
problem. But if the database lies on an other server, a potential attacker may moni-
tor data passed in plain text, between the database and the application server, over
the network. Then the security guideline , “Encrypt communication lines”, should be
followed, and all communication flowing between the server and the database should
be encrypted.
The risk of information disclosure (R5) has a high value (10) on the ranking of
risk in the table shown in Figure 4.12, in chapter 4, “Requirements engineering”.
Therefore, this risk should be avoided.
In chapter 3, it was suggested to use encryption over the communication channel
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to prevent information disclosure. Now, knowing which technologies to use, we can
refine this solution. If the application server and database is in the same, secure
environment, the problem is already solved. But if they need to communicate over
a network, there should either be a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connection, using
OpenSSL6, or a secure connection using the IP Security Protocol (IPSec)7 should be
established.
Encryption of sensitive data stored in the database, for instance the password,
is important, and is a part of the security guideline 2.1.5, “Defence in depth”. In
the “Person” table, we should therefore encrypt the password, in accordance with
requirement DBR1..
5.4 The View
Figure 5.3: Files in the view.
The view defines how the model is rendered to the user, and is the graphical user
interface (GUI). The web pages shown to the user, can be looked upon as classes.
In our design, these classes will be JSP files, that is, static HTML files containing
dynamic content using JSP. Figure 5.3 shows all the JSP class files in the view,
bundled into small packages, which then again is put in one big package. Together,
these files presents the applications content to the users through the web browser
6For definition of OpenSSL, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
7For definition of IPSec, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
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(presentation tier). During the design of the view, we refer to the application as the
(web) site.
This section will explain what functionality the different classes in the view have.
How the JSP classes in the view interacts with the business logic, is left to the
following section, “The Controller”.
We have sorted the classes into smaller packages according to what actions the
classes perform. Similar and subsequent actions, have been put in the same package.
These small packages are, as the figure shows, called “Layout”, “Top”, “Menu”,
“PersonalInfo”, “Administrator”, “Event” and “Order”. Notice, that some of the
classes has the prefix “Secure” or “Sec”. These secure versions are to be used when
a user is logged on to the system, and should not be cached. This is according to
both security guideline 2.2.3, “Limit cache usage” and the system requirement SR4
in chapter 4, “Requirements engineering”.
Layout
The “Layout” package contains classes that forms the web page’s layout. The web
page should have a vertical menu on the left side (“Menu”), a top field lying hori-
zontally across the entire upper part of the page (“Top”), and a main page in the
middle that shows information about the site (“Mainpage”).
Top
The “Top” package holds the links “Login” before a user logs on to the site, and
“Logout” when the user is logged on. The “Login” page shown to the user, contains
one field for entering username, and one field for entering password. In addition, it
contains a link that says “Register new user account”, that the user can click on if
he or she is a new user, and a forgot password function.
Menu
The “Menu” package holds the links a user may click on. The links leads to pages
containing information the user might find useful, like event-, contact information,
and information about the site. It is the classes “Events”, “ContactInformation” and
“About” that provides the user this information through the web browser.
PersonalInfo
The “PersonalInfo” package holds the classes “UserInfo”, “ShowUserInfo”, “Edit-
PersonalInfo” and “EditInfoOK”. “UserInfo” presents the user a form through the
web browser where the user can enter personal information. The form should contain
the fields enlisted in requirement RUA1 in chapter 4, “Requirements Engineering”,
and a hidden field called “role” with default value “user”. “ShowUserInfo” shows
the personal information that the user has stored in the database. The class “Edit-
Information” presents the user a form through the web browser where he or she can
edit his or her personal information. The information the user may edit, is accord-
ing to requirement RU1 in chapter 4, “Requirements Engineering”. Both regular-,
administrator- and super users may be presented with this view.
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SuperUsers
The “SuperUsers” package holds the classes “EditAdmin”, “AddAdmin”, “ChangeAd-
min”, “RemoveAdmin” and “EditAdminOK”. “EditAdmin”shows the super user
which administrator users he or she can choose from, and a button “Add admin-
istrator”. “AddAdmin” shows a form where the super user can add information on a
user (according to requirement SU4), using a form equal as in the “UserInfo” class in
the “PersonalInfo” package, except that the hidden field now should have the value
“administrator”. The class “ChangeAdmin” equals the “EditPersonalInfo” from the
“PersonalInfo” package. “DeleteAdmin” is a class that presents a list to the super
user through the browser where all enlisted elements have a box next to them. The
super user can tick off all the administrators he or she wants to delete, and press a
“Delete” button.
Event
The “Event” package contains several classes. The “Events” class shows the users
through the web browser which event the user can choose from. The classes“Concerts”,
“Theaters” and “Musicals” presents information about the events. Administrator-
and super users are presented the content from the classes “EditEvents”, “Ad-
dEvents”, “ChangeEvents”, “RemoveEvents” and “EditEventsOK”. “EditEvents”
shows a list with all of the registered events, and a button “Add event”. “AddE-
vents” shows a form the administrator- or super user can fill out in order to add
an event. “ChangeEvents” shows a form where the administrator- and super users
can enter updated information on events. “RemoveEvents” shows a list of all events,
with a box behind each element, and a button that says “Remove event”. Then the
administrator- and super user can tick off the elements they want to remove, and
push the button. The Super users is also presented with a “Delete” button (require-
ment SU6). The “EditEventOK” class presents through the web browser a message
saying that the editing of an event went well.
Order
The “Order” package contains three classes, namely “Order”, “EnterPayment” and
“OrderOK”. The “Order” class presents the user with a form with event information,
and a question about how many tickets he or she wants to order. The “EnterPay-
ment” shows a form where the user can enter payment information. The “OrderOK”
class presents through the web browser a message saying that the ordering tickets
for an event went well.
Security
Since we are using the Model-View-Controller approach, there is no business logic
in the view. Therefore, when it comes to security, we have to make the end users
aware of the security breaches that may occur, like telling them not to leave their
work stations when logged on to systems or applications and never to give away their
user credentials. This is according to the security guideline 2.1.9, “Awareness”. If
users doesn’t learn about the threats that are out there, and aimed at them, they
can easily be exposed to social engineering attacks like phishing. The most regular
form of a phishing attack, is that the attacker sends the user an email, claiming to
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be system administrator, saying he or she needs the users credentials, and asks the
user to fill out a form accessible through an appended link.
The risk of a phishing attack (R2) occurring, has a very high estimated risk
value (12) on the ranking of risks in the table shown in Figure 4.12 in chapter 4,
“Requirements engineering”. It is therefore important to make the users aware of
this type of attack.
In chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures”, it is suggested to
solve the problem of phishing by making the users of the application aware of the
problem. This could be done by asking the user to be selective to what information
that is good, and what is bad. Following are a list with suggestions to the user of how
to deal with situations where he or she gets insecure. The list is from The Center for
Information Security in Norway [30]:
• If something seems to good to be true, it might be the case.
• If you are insecure about if the content in an email is malicious or not, check
with others.
• Be sceptic towards contact information or links that arrives in an email.
• Check the addresses on the web. Fake web pages can look identical as the
legitimate ones.
5.5 The Controller
The pages presented to the user is only a GUI. If the application should be able to
perform actions, there is need for some business logic, which is placed in the controller
of the MVC architecture.
Figure 5.4: Files in the controller.
Figure 5.4 shows a package called “Controller” which contain smaller packages
called “PersonalInfo”, “Events”, “Order”, “SuperUsers” and “Database”. As in the
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previous section, the classes are categorized with regard to what actions they perform.
This time, it is both JSP- and Java classes in the smaller packages. This is because
some of the business logic should be implemented in Java classes.
5.5.1 JSP classes
To explain the functionality we will divide the JSP classes from the Java classes, and
start off with the JSP classes. To get a better overview of what action they should
perform, we have drawn a component diagram where the files from the view and
the JSP files from the controller are interweaved, showing how they are connected to
each other. The diagrams are inspired from regular class diagrams, showing relations
between entities [40].
We would like to emphasize that these diagrams does not show the flow between
the classes, only the connection between them. The diagrams are divided into the
subsections Before login, Regular users, Administrator users and Super users like the
requirements in chapter 4, “Requirements engineering”. This gives a better picture
of what different actions users are able to perform, and it makes it easier to explain
what the JSP classes in the “Controller” package does. The control elements are put
in yellow boxes, so that they are easy to spot.
Before login
Figure 5.5: Component diagram - Before login.
Figure 5.5 shows how the web page is built up before the user logs on to the
system. The classes in the view was explained in previous section. Following is a
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description of the controller JSP classes.
“EventList” should get information about the event the user chose through the
“Event” class in the view. Then the class checks if it is a user before log in, a regular
user or an administrator user that asks for this information. Here, it is the user before
log in, and therefore, “EventList” returns the information to either the “Concerts”,
“Theaters” or “Musicals” class, depending on the type of event the user chose.
“CheckUserInfo” should check if the input the user entered in the form in the
“UserInfo” class, is valid according to requirement RUA1b in chapter 4, “Require-
ment engineering”.
“InsertUser” should receive the validated information from the “CheckUserInfo”
class, and insert it into the database.
Regular users
Figure 5.6: Component diagram - Regular users.
Figure 5.6, shows how the web page is built up when a regular user is logged on
to the system. The layout is the same as for users before login. The difference is
that the user now may log out (instead of log in), order tickets, and edit personal
information.
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The “EventList” should get information about the event the user chose through
the “Event” class in the view. Then the class checks if it is a user before log in,
a regular user or an administrator user that asks for this information. Here, it is
the regular user , and therefore, “EventList” returns the information to the “Sec-
Concerts”, “SecTheaters” or “SecMusicals” class, depending on the type of event the
user chose.
The “CheckOrder” class, should get input from the “Order” class, that says how
many tickets the user wants to order. The “CheckOrder” class checks if there are
more tickets left, and if so, it returns the users personal information to the web
browser through the “ShowUserInfo” class in the view.
“PaymentChecked” should receive payment information that the user have en-
tered into a form in the “EnterPayment” class from the view. If the user has enough
money on his or her account, the “PaymentChecked” will let the order go through.
“CheckUserInfo” has the same functionality as before login. The “UpdateInfo”
is similar to the “InsertUser” class, but instead of inserting each field in the form
coming from the “EditPersonalInfo” class in the view, it updates only those fields
where changes have been made by the user.
Administrator users
Figure 5.7: Component diagram - Administrator users.
The administrators gets a specific URL to where they can find their login in page.
Figure 5.7 has the same layout as the regular user, but with some variations in the
functionality available. The functionality is according to requirements in Table 4.3
in chapter 4, “System requirements”.
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“EditPersonalInfo” is similar to the same functionality for regular users, and are
not drawn into the figure to keep from getting too complex.
“EventList” should get information about the event the user chose through the
“Event” class in the view. Then the class checks if it is a user before log in, a regular
user or an administrator user that asks for this information. Here, it is the administra-
tor, and therefore, “EventList” returns the information to either the “ChangeEvent”
or “RemoveEvent” class, depending on the type of event the user chose. (Note, that
if the administrator chooses the “Add event” button in the “Event” class, he or she
is presented the view of the “AddEvent” class.)
“UpdateEventInfo” either inserts a new event in the database, or updates the in-
formation that the administrator has entered in the “ChangeEvent” or “RemoveEvent”
classes.
Super users
Figure 5.8: Component diagram - Super users.
Figure 5.8 shows what the page looks like after a super user logs in. The super
users finds the login page as the administrator, by entering a known address in the
URL.
According to requirements in Table 4.4 in the previous chapter, a super user is
capable of editing a administrator account.
The “EditEvent” procedure is equal to the one for the administrator, except
that the super user also have the privilege to delete an event. This is according to
requirement SU1c in chapter 4, “Requirement engineering”.
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The “EditAdmin” class enlisted all administrator users to the super user through
the web browser. The “ShowAdmins” class should get information about the chosen
administrator, and send it to the “ChangeAdmin” or the “DeleteAdmin” class.
The “UpdateAdminInfo” class either inserts a new administrator user in the
database, or update the changed information the super user has entered on the
chosen administrator.
5.5.2 Java classes
Figure 5.9: Class diagram of the business logics Java files.
As the “Controller” package in Figure 5.4 showed, the control part of our MVC
architecture, also contain Java files. Using Java files helps us centralizing the business
logic, and makes it easier to expand functionality. This is according to security
guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”, where the Java files can be choke points where all
security critical operations are lead through.
Figure 5.9 shows the Java classes and the relation between them. The model is
from [40]. The classes contains some methods that is necessary to perform wanted
operations, and these will be used in sequence diagrams in section 5.6, to explain the
flow of the operations.
But first we will enlist the classes shown in Figure 5.9, and give a brief description
of how what functions they should contain.
ConnectManager. The “ConnectManager” should be the only class to establish a
connection with the database using JDBC. All other classes should connect to
68 Web Application Security
the database through thhe “ConnectManager”. The “ConnectManager” should
execute queries, execute updates, and close the connection.
UserInfo. The “UserInfo” should be a JavaBean that validates all personal informa-
tion coming from regular users, administrator users and super users, and insert
and update information through the “ConnectManager” using SQL queries.
EventInfo. The “EventInfo’ class should extract information from the database
through the “ConnectManager” using SQL queries.
AdminEvent. The “AdminEvent” contains methods for adding events, changing
events and removing events using SQL queries. If the super user chooses to
delete an event, this should also be handled in this class.
OrderInfo. The “OrderInfo” class should send an SQL query to the database to
check if there are enough tickets left according to the users order. If so, the
class must check if the user has enough money on his or her account. If there
is enough money, the “OrderInfo” class executes the order by sending an SQL
query through the “ConnectManager” to the database.
PaymentInfo. The “PaymentInfo” class establishes a secure connection to the VISA
terminal, checks if the user has enough cash on his or her account and returns
true or false to the “OrderInfo” class.
Security
Using a MVC architecture keeps a simple and an easy-to-follow design of the appli-
cations business logic. It makes it easy to create choke points where we lead critical
security operations through. This is according to security guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it
simple”. Using the “ConnectManager” to handle all connections with the database,
is one choke point. If the database and the application server is connected over a
network, it is only the “ConnectMangager” file that has to make sure that a secure
connection between the two of them is established.
The business logic handles all input from the user, that is, from the client side.
One of the biggest risks that comes with user inputs, is the risk of SQL injections
(R3), that are ranked with a high risk value (12) in our risk analysis in Figure
4.12. There is also a risk that some users might try to elevate their privileges (R9),
by logging in as a higher privileged user. In addition, there is a risk of release of
message content (R7) when payment information is sent from the application server
to the VISA terminal. All of these attacks can be circumvented.
Using the “UserInfo” class to take care of all input validation, is a good counter-
measure against SQL injections. If there is discovered a security flaw in the validation
procedure, that lets an SQL injection attack take place, this can be repaired in the
“UserInfo” class. All forms that takes input from the user and uses the “UserInfo”
class to validate input, will be fixed, as soon as the “UserInfo” is fixed. This makes
the “UserInfo” class a choke point where critical security operations are lead through,
which is according the security guideline 2.1.3. In addition it follows the guideline
2.1.1, “Validate input”.
As to elevation of privileges, this may be an attack performed by an attacker that
has gotten his or her hands on an administrator- or super users user credentials. By
giving the administrator and super users an URL where they can find their log on
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page, instead of putting a link on the front page of the application, available to all
users, we make it a little bit harder for the attacker to find a way in to the system.
When it comes to the release of message content attack, there must be a secure,
encrypted connection established between the “PaymentInfo” and the VISA terminal.
This can be done using IPSec.
5.6 Sequence diagrams
Objects communicate by sending messages. To carry out a certain task, a particular
sequence of messages may have to be exchanged between two or more entities [40].
The time ordering in which this sequence of messages has to occur may be depicted in
a sequence diagram. Such a diagram depicts the interactions between class instances,
in the form of method calls and call returns [44]. We have chosen to model security
critical operations in our application in sequence diagrams to shed light on processes
that it is important to security.
We will focus on modeling the actions that takes place between the JSP files,
the Java files, and the database. The view is presented as the web browser, the
controllers with the names of files, and the model as the database (DB).
5.6.1 Login
Figure 5.10: Sequence diagram - Login.
We’ll start off presenting the log on routine. Figure 5.10 shows what happens in
the application tier when a user chooses to log on to the system.
First, the user must enter his or her user credentials into a form on the “Login”
page in the view (web browser) to be authenticated. Then this information is sent
to the application server, which is the Tomcat server introduced in section 5.2. The
Tomcat asks the database for user credentials. The database executes a query, and
returns the values to the Tomcat server. The Tomcat checks if the users input
matches the stored values in the database. If so, it returns a session identifier to the
user, and the secure mainpage, and the user is logged in.
Security
When it comes to security, it is important that the database either is in a safe,
closed environment with the Tomcat server, or establishes a secure connection to the
database, using for instance OpenSSL with MySQL [15]. If this is not done, both
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the application servers log on information to the database, and the user’s credentials
might be revealed to a potential attacker, who might perform the passive attack,
release of message content (R7).
5.6.2 Logout
Figure 5.11: Sequence diagram - Logout.
Figure 5.11 shows how the logout procedure takes place in the system. The user
presses the logout button in the “Top” window, and a the “Logout” JSP class in
the view, sends the message to the Tomcat server. The tomcat server invalidates the
message.
Security
As the user logs out of the system, it should not be possible to press the “back” button
in the web browser, and then reenter the logged in session. This can be avoided, by
setting the header information to “no-cache” in the classes used by the regular user
with the prefix “Secure” and “Sec”. All of the classes to the administrator and super
user should have this restriction as well. This is according to the system requirement
SR4a, “Sensitive data should not be cached”, and security guideline 2.2.3, “Limit
cache usage”..
If the user then presses the “back” button after he or she has logged out, there
will be displayed an error message stating that the session has expired.
5.6.3 ConnectManager
Figure 5.12 pictures the interaction between the Java file “ConnectManager” and the
database.
What happens, is that the “ConnectManager” establish a connection between the
application server and the database, using the method getConnection(). Further, the
“ConnectManager” should execute all queries that comes from other classes in the
business logic, and execute all updates. When the “ConnectManager” is finished
with its work, it closes the connection with the database.
Security
All correspondance the controller has with the database, should go through the “Con-
nectManager” file. Then this file will work as a choke point for data going from the
controller to the database, according to security guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”.
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Figure 5.12: Sequence diagram - ConnectManager.
Again it is important that the database either is in a safe, closed environment
with the Tomcat server, or that it is established a secure connection to the MySQL
database using either IPSec, or OpenSSL8
5.6.4 Register and edit user information
Figure 5.13: Sequence diagram - Register and edit user information.
Figure 5.13 describes what happens between the view and the controller when
a user registers to the system for the first time, and when a user updates personal
information.
8.
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First, the user chooses to register as a new user, and fills out a form with his
or her personal information. The web browser posts the form containing user infor-
mation to the application server. There, a JavaBean called “UserInfo” checks if the
input the user has entered, is on a correct form. If the information is correct, the
“UserInfo” bean uses an insertUser()-method to insert the users information into the
database. The connection between the JavaBean and the database, goes through the
“ConnectManager”. The change is sent to the view through the “InsertUser” JSP
file, which is shown in the “Controller package” in Figure 5.4.
When the user wants to edit his or her personal information, the web browser
sends the users updates, to the application server. There, the “UserInfo” bean again
validates the users input, and sends them off to the “ConnectManager” if they are
correct. Then the “ConnectManager” connects to the database and executes an
update. The update is sent to the view through the “UpdateInfo” JSP file, which is
shown in the “Controller” package in Figure 5.4.
Security
One of the biggest threats this application faces, according to our risk analysis in
Figure 4.12, is the SQL-injection (R3) that has a high risk value (12). By validating
all user input, the risk of SQL injection will be reduced.
According to security guideline 2.2.1, “Validate input on the server side”, all input
coming from the client side should be validated. Keeping all the validation logic in a
JavaBean, makes it easier to maintain the validation process. For instance, if there
is found a vulnerability in one of the input fields, this is repaired in the JavaBean.
Everywhere in the application where this input field is present, will be updated.
When using centralized security mechanisms, like putting the validation process
in a JavaBean in the controller, there is no need to identify every page that handles
this type of input, and update every single page. Not only is it easy to overlook a
page containing this input field, but it is hard to test if the improvement has been
implemented correctly at each one of them. Leading all critical security operations
through a choke point, like all validation through a JavaBean, is according to security
guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”.
5.6.5 Events
Figure 5.14: Sequence diagram - Event.
Figure 5.14 explains the flow of actions when the user wants to watch which
events that the web application has information on.
Web Application Security 73
The user clicks on the event he or she wants more information about, in the web
browser. The Java file “EventInfo” on the controller side, contacts the “Connect-
Manager” and asks that file to extract the information on the chosen event from the
database. The “ConnectManager” executes its actions, and returns the result to the
“EventInfo” file. The “EventInfo” uses the “EventList” JSP file to return the result
to the view.
Security
As for security, all the connections with the database goes through the “Connect-
Manager”. This will help to keep an easy-to-follow architecture, and is according to
the security guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”.
5.6.6 Administrator editing events
Figure 5.15: Sequence diagram - Administrators editing events.
Figure 5.15 describes how an administrator can add, change and remove events
from the database. The super user can edit events the same way as the administrator.
There will not be drawn a sequence diagram for that operation, since it is exactly
the same.
The administrator chooses through the web browser, for instance, to change an
event. He chooses which event he wants to change, the same way as shown in the
sequence diagram in Figure 5.14. When the event is shown in the administrators
web browser, he makes the necessary changes through a form, and sends the form to
the controller.
The request is sent to the Java file “AdminEvent” on the controller side. This
Java file takes the information from the form, creates an SQL query to the database
to insert the information. The SQL query is sent to the “ConnectManager”, and
this file handles all the database communication. When the database returns the
result to the “ConnectManager”, it is forwarded to the “AdminEvent’, which then
again uses the JSP controller file “UpdateEventInfo” to return the result to the view.
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The administrator receives a response through the web browser that the update was
successful, through the JSP view file, “EditEventOK”.
Security
It is assumed that the administrator is a good guy. But if the administrator is a
crook who wants to tamper with information stored in the database, he or she would
have the possibility to try to send an SQL-injection through the form used to edit
event information.
But when using Java to handle all the business logic, this will filter out the error
messages coming directly from the database, and not reveal core database information
to the administrator. Since having Java files in the business logic, detailed error
messages won’t arrive on the client side. This is according to the security guideline
2.1.2 “Fail securely”.
5.6.7 OrderInfo
Figure 5.16: Sequence diagram - Order.
Figure 5.16 illustrates the coherence between the web browser, the “OrderInfo”,
the “PaymentInfo” and the “ConnectManager”.
When the user is logged on to the system, he or she can order tickets to desired
events through the web browser. Information about the order is posted in a form to
the controller.
The controller has a Java file called “OrderInfo”, that handles the business logic
behind the order. It checks in the database, via the ‘ConnectManager”, if there are
more tickets left to the requested event. If so, it sends a request to get the users
personal information from the database, again via the “ConnectManager”. When
the information arrives, the JSP file “CheckOrder”, that hands over the information
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to a JSP page in the view called “ShowUserInfo”. This page tells the user to either
edit the personal information end then enter payment information, or confirm that
personal information is correct, and then enter payment information.
The user enters payment information in a form within the JSP view file, “En-
terPayment”. The “OrderInfo” checks if the user has enough money on his or her
account, through the “PaymentInfo” Java file. (This file handles all connections to
the VISA terminal, and the procedure will be described in the following subsection.)
If so, the “OrderInfo” execute the order, updates the “Order” table in the database
with order information, and sends the JSP file “PaymentChecked” back to the web
browser, which shows the page “OrderOK” to the user.
Security
With regard to security, it is important that the communication line between the web
browser and the business logic is encrypted. Encrypting this connection, is according
to the security guideline 5.3, “Encrypt communication lines”. If the communication
line is not encrypted, there will be a risk of replay attacks occurring. That is,
an attacker may resend a users order repeatedly, and thereby orders an unwanted
amount of tickets on the users behalf.
In addition, it is very important that the payment information data is not stored
in the users cache when a web page is posted. Then sensitive payment information
will be stored locally on the users computer, and could therefore be exploited by
others using the same machine. Not storing the payment information in cache, is
according to security guideline 2.2.3, “Limit cache usage”.
5.6.8 VISA payment
Figure 5.17: Sequence diagram - VISA payment.
Figure 5.17 shows how the “PaymentInfo” Java file interacts with a VISA termi-
nal. First, the “PaymentInfo” establish a secure connection with the VISA terminal.
Then it sends a request to check if the user has enough money on his or her account.
Then the VISA terminal does a coverage control. If the customer has enough money
on his or her account, the buy can go through.
Security
As for the application, all the payment information from the user must be sent over
an encrypted communication channel from the web browser to the application server.
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This can be done using the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) offered by the Tomcat.
The communication between the “PaymentInfo” and the VISA terminal must
also be secured. This could for instance be done using IPSec.
5.7 Summary
This chapter started off presenting the architecture we have chosen for our applica-
tion, and why we chose exactly this one. There have also been a short introduction to
technologies that is advantageous to have knowledge about for better understanding
our design.
The design of the web application have, in addition to modeling the functionality,
emphasized where the system is vulnerable and might be exposed to threats. Design-
ing an application with constant focus on where the security is threatened, requires
that you have thought through different threats and vulnerabilities that is likely to
occur in the front edge of the design. Otherwise it might be hard to spot eventual
threats.
The upcoming chapter will describe an implementation we did of the application
that we have designed. The goal is to see how we can solve some of the security
issues pointed out in the requirements and design, on the Java platform.
Chapter 6
Implementation
Throughout the development process, and working on this report, the focus has been
set on security guidelines. The process of identifying needed functionality and relating
it to potential threats, has been a main goal of this project. We have implemented
a online ticket ordering system according to our requirements and design, but also
according to our security guidelines. The requirements tables, which were identified
in chapter 4, “Requirements engineering” have been repeated in Appendix D, this
time with marks to indicate implemented functionality. In this chapter we will be
presenting interesting parts of the implementation, that is, parts of it relevant to
security. From the risk analysis at the end of chapter 4, “Requirements engineering”
we have chosen one of the highest ranking threats to our application, SQL injection,
which will be further treated in this chapter. In addition, we have chosen to present
how prevention of cross site scripting attack is implemented, as this is an attack that
requires that an authenticated administrator is a crook. This is interesting, and also
a reminder that one of the threats to applications of any kind is attacks from the
inside.
Security guidelines one through six is shown implemented in various sections of
this chapter. In addition, all of our specific web application guidelines have been il-
lustrated, in addition to a presentation of two widespread technologies, Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) and the use of J2EE containers. Concurrency is also treated briefly at
the end of the chapter.
As the implementation is presented, screen shots from our application is included
along the way. Appendix F contains all of our code1.
6.1 Assumptions and simplifications
Developing a web application with limited resources requires that some assumptions
be taken. They are present in the list below.
• All ordered tickets will be sent, with a bill, by post to customers. The reason
why we have chosen this approach is that to connect a web application to a
VISA terminal cost money, and is not necessary as we have already identified
the important concepts concerning this procedure.
1The installation guide is provided on a CD which contains all of the applications code.
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• The procedure of editing personal information when logged in is left out, be-
cause this functionality would not shed light on any aspects different from the
register user procedure.
• The administrator and super users will not be implemented.
6.2 The application and security considerations in
Java
The application we have implemented, picks up on some of the security issues ac-
cording to our design. We have focused on making the application as illustrative as
possible.
The web site we have created is a ticket ordering site, called “OnlineTicketOrder-
ing” (OTO), and Figure 6.1 shows a screen dump of the front page. More screen
Figure 6.1: This is what the front page in our application looks like.
dumps are found in Appendix D. Those that describes pages where security consid-
erations has been made, are also to be found in this chapter where it is necessary,
along with code examples and a textual description.
6.2.1 Using the Secure Socket Layer
To safeguard communication between the browser and the server, we make use of the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), which is supported by Tomcat. SSL is a technology which
allows web browsers and web servers to communicate over a secured connection. This
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means that the data that is sent is first encrypted by the sender, transmitted, and
then decrypted by the receiver before processing continues. This is a two-way process,
in the sense that both the server and the browser encrypt all traffic before sending
data [38].
Another important aspect of the SSL protocol is authentication. During an initial
attempt to communicate with a web server over a secure connection, the server will
present your web browser with a set of credentials, in the form of a digital certificate2,
as proof of who the site is and what it claims to be. In certain cases, the server may
also request a certificate from your web browser, asking for proof that you are who
you claim to be. This is known as client authentication [37].
Since we have been using SSL, we also maintain confidentiality and integrity of
data, since the encrypted communication makes it hard for an attacker to tap- and/or
tamper the data.
For instance, when a user orders a ticket, this is done under the protection of SSL.
Figure 6.2 shows the ordering ticket part, where the user has ordered a ticket, and
have to confirm shipping information. Since SSL is used to protect these transactions,
the risk of a replay attack is reduced.
Figure 6.2: This is what the application looks like when a user has decided to order
a ticket.
2A digital certificate is a digital representation of information which at least identifies the certi-
fication authority issuing it, names or identifies its Subscriber, contains the subscribers public key,
identifies its operational period, and is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it [44].
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6.2.2 Using containers
When a user has registered him- or herself in the system, he or she can log on to
it through the login window shown in Figure 6.3. The log on procedure is put in
Figure 6.3: This screen dump shows how the login window looks like.
a container. A servlet container is the connection between a web server and the
servlets. It provides the runtime environment for all the servlets on the server as
defined by the servlet specification, and is responsible for loading and invoking those
servlets when the time is right [2].
The servlet container is responsible for mapping incoming requests to a servlet
registered to handle the resource identified by the URL, and passing the request mes-
sage to that servlet. After the request is processed, it is the containers responsibility
to convert the response object created by the servlet into a response message, and
send it back to the client [2].
In our log on procedure, the container is used in the authentication process [3].
This process involves associating the current servlet request object, the current ex-
ecute thread, and the internal session, with the user’s identity. By associating a
session with the identity, the container can guarantee that the current request and
all subsequent requests by the same user can be associated with the same session
until that user’s session is invalidated [2].
J2EE-based web containers offer three types of authentication mechanisms; basic,
form-based and mutual authentication [10]. Most web applications use the form-
based authentication mechanism, because it allows the application to customize he
authentication user interface. Our application does the same. The ¡login-config¿
section of web.xml defines the type of authentication mechanism, and the URLs to
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login and error pages. The following is an excerption of our web.xml file:
<login-config>
<auth-method>FORM</auth-method>
<form-login-config>
<form-login-page>/OTO/Login.jsp</form-login-page>
<form-error-page>/OTO/LoginError.jsp</form-error-page>
</form-login-config>
</login-config>
In this excerption, the authentication method is set to form-based, and whenever
a user requests a protected page, if he or she has not yet been authenticated, they will
be redirected to the login.jsp so that they may provide their credentials. Should an
error occur, or the authentication fail, the user will be taken to the LoginError.jsp
page.
The pages that are to be protected are identified in the next excerption, encapsu-
lated by the <url-pattern> tags. In our application, all files placed in the secure
sub directory of the OTO directory are protected. It is also possible to specify pro-
tection of HTTP-methods, if you choose to specify any in the list of <http-method>s,
only those specified will be protected. We have protected all HTTP-methods.
<security-constraint>
<web-resource-collection>
<web-resource-name>Protected area</web-resource-name>
<url-pattern>/OTO/secure/*</url-pattern>
<http-method>DELETE</http-method>
<http-method>GET</http-method>
<http-method>POST</http-method>
<http-method>PUT</http-method>
</web-resource-collection>
<auth-constraint>
<role-name>user</role-name>
</auth-constraint>
<user-data-constraint>
<transport-guarantee>CONFIDENTIAL</transport-guarantee>
</user-data-constraint>
</security-constraint>
<security-role>
<role-name>user</role-name>
</security-role>
<security-role>-elements specify the configured roles that the application may
use in the <security-constraint>. The <auth-constraint> tag, that lies inside
the <security-constraint>, defines what roles in the system should have access
to the area in question. In other words, containers provides both authentication
and authorization. Authorization is enforced at page level. In our application, users,
which translates to “regular users” have access to the secure directory after successful
login. To be able to accommodate separate areas for the administrators and super
users, corresponding areas would have to be defined.
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Whenever we send a user ID and password over the network, the password is sent
in base64-encoding3. This is considered to be clear text, so the transport connection
should be encrypted. The <security-constraint> requests an SSL connection by
specifying CONFIDENTIAL in the <transport-guarantee> tag.
Database realm
A realm is a “database” of usernames and passwords that identify valid users of a
web application, plus an enumeration of the list of roles associated with each user.
A particular user may have any number of roles associated with their username [26].
Tomcat 5 defines a Java interface (org.apache.catalina.Realm) that provides support
for connection to existing authentication databases. We have stored authentication
information in our relational database, and thus the security realm is set to our
database. It will be accessed through JDBC, and it is configured in server.xml. An
excerpt is shown below:
<Realm className="org.apache.catalina.realm.JDBCRealm" digest="SHA" debug="99"
driverName="org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver"
connectionURL="jdbc:mysql://mysql.stud.ntnu.no/ninai_db"
connectionName="ninai_admin" connectionPassword="1LEfant"
userTable="Users" userNameCol="UserID" userCredCol="Password"
userRoleTable="User_roles" roleNameCol="Rolename" />
Some requirements needs to be fulfilled when using the database as the security realm.
There must be a table that contains one row for each valid user this Realm should
recognize. The table is “Users”, as seen in the excerption of the database related to
the authentication process in Figure 6.4. The “Users” table is required to contain
at least two columns, one for username and one for password. This expressed in the
server.xml file, in the last but one line, and can be seen in the database figure.
There must also be a table that contains one row for every valid role the user is
assigned to. This table must contain at least two columns, username and rolename.
We have called this table “User roles”. The last table seen in Figure 6.4 is the “Role”
table. This table maintains the list of available roles in the application.
Figure 6.4: Database realm.
Alternative realms is memory realm, which is the Tomcat default realm (and
which can be configured in tomcat-users) and LDAP4.
In sum, web containers perform the the following steps to implement security of
a web application.
3In computing, base64 is a data encoding scheme whereby binary-encoded data is converted to
printable ASCII characters [44].
4Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
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• Determines whether the user has been authenticated when the protected web
resources are accessed.
• If the user has not been authenticated yet, requests that the user provide
security credentials by redirecting to the login page.
• Validates the users credentials against the security realm configured for the
container.
• Determines whether the authenticated user is authorized to access web re-
sources.
In our application, the session is invalidated (requirement RU4a)) when the user
logs out from the system using the logout button (requirement RU4c)), or if the
inlogged-user has not performed any action in the application in 15 minutes (re-
quirement RU4d)). When the users session is invalidated, the user is taken back to
the mainpage.
We could have created a JavaScript that would have ended the session when the
user closes the web browser. But this requires that the popup-blocker is not turned
on in the browser. Today, it is practically default that people have popup-blockers
turned on in their web browsers. In addition, only a few web browsers support
JavaScript. Since we then cannot guarantee that closing the web browser ends a
users session, we don’t implement this functionality either.
6.2.3 Password encryption
When the user enters his or her password, the password will be sent over the en-
crypted SSL communication lines to the application server. Here, the password is
encrypted with the SHA1-algorithm using the Tomcat and MySQL API. The first
code excerption shows how, when the realm is set to the database in server.xml,
SHA is set to be the encryption algorithm.
Realm className="org.apache.catalina.realm.JDBCRealm" digest="SHA"
debug="99"
Next, in the JavaBean, the password is encrypted in the insertUser() method:
String sqlUpdateUsers = "insert into Users values
(’"+login+"’,SHA1(’"+pwd+"’));"
If a user enters “password” as their password, the SHA1-algorithm will transform
it into “5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8”, which is useless outside the
scope of the application.
Since all passwords are stored encrypted in the database, they will not be read-
able if someone manages to hack into the database. This maintains confidentiality,
and it satisfy three of our security guidelines, namely 2.1.4 “Use and reuse trusted
components”, 2.1.5 “Defence in depth” and 2.1.6 “Secure the weakest link”.
When encrypting the password, we made use of a library (API) that has been
tested by multiple users over a certain time period. We have not found any docu-
mentation indicating that the SHA1-algorithm should not be considered safe. To use
the SHA1-algorithm is thus in accordance with the security guideline “Use and reuse
trusted components”.
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By encrypting of the password, we have employed the security guideline “Defence
in depth”. Passwords are first transferred safely by the use of SSL from the client
to the server, they are then encrypted, and stored in the database. This results in,
that if anyone by any chance gets access to the password file in the database, the
passwords there are cryptic and not useful to the hacker.
By encrypting the password, we have encrypted a weak link in our application.
Therefore, we have also followed the security guideline “Secure the weakest link”.
6.2.4 No cache
In most web browsers “back” and “forward” buttons exist and allow users to go
back or forward on a page. If the “back” button causes the web browser to display
stale pages from their caches after the logout process, the application has a security
problem.
When the “back” button is clicked, the browser on default does not request a
page from the web server. Instead, the browser reloads the page from its cache. This
problem is common across all technologies, and not only Java-based ones.
The caches are advantageous to static HTML pages or pages that are graphic- or
image intensive. Web applications, on the other hand, are more data-oriented. As
data in web applications is likely to change more frequently, it is also more important
to display fresh data to end users than saving some response time by going to the
cache and displaying stale or of out-of-date information.
The HTTP protocol has headers that will be useful in this setting [16]. “Expires”
and “Cache-Control” headers offers the application server a mechanism for controlling
the browsers and proxies5 caches. The HTTP “Expires” header dictates the proxies’
caches when the pages “freshness” will expire. The HTTP “Cache-Control”, which
was new under the HTTP 1.1 Specification, contains attributes that instruct the
browsers to prevent caching on any desired page in the web application. When
the “back” button encounters such a page, the browser sends the HTTP request to
the application server for a new copy of that page. The descriptions for necessary
Cache-Control header’s directives follow:
no-cache: forces the caches to obtain a new copy of the page from the origin server.
no-store: directs the caches not to store the page under any circumstances.
The directives to caching somewhat overlap, but combined they give good pro-
tection against unwanted caching [9]. For backward compatibility to HTTP 1.0,
the Pragma:no-cache directive, which is equivalent to HTTP 1.1 Cache-Control:
no-cache in HTTP 1.1, may be included in the headers response.
The following scriptlet is executed at the beginning of our JSP pages to prevent
them from being cached at the browser.
<%
response.setHeader("Cache-control","no-cache");
response.setHeader("Cache-control","no-store");
response.setDateHeader("Expires", 0);
response.setHeader("Pragma","no-cache");
%>
5Server placed between a user’s machine and the Internet [44].
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The response.setDateHeader("Expires", 0); prevents caching at the proxy
server. The reason why we have employed these HTTP header directives is to fulfill
requirement SR4, “Sensitive data should not be cached” and the security guideline
2.2.3 , “Limit cache usage”. If the user is logged out of the system, and presses
the “back” button in the web browser, he or she will be sent directly back to the
login-page.
6.2.5 Preventing SQL injections
The SQL injection attack was presented in chapter 3, “Vulnerabilities, threats and
countermeasures” with an example and countermeasures. As was mentioned, almost
all platforms are vulnerable to this attack and any input field in the application that
make up clauses of a database query is candidate for an SQL injection. As this threat
was ranked among the top three threats, with a score of 12 out of 15 possible points
in our risk analysis, we will be treating it quite thoroughly, and give details as to
how we avoided it in our application.
In our application, if the user wants to order tickets, he or she must be logged in.
To be able to log in, the user needs to be registered. Figure 6.5 shows the registration
form.
Figure 6.5: Screnn dump of how the registration form looks like in the web applica-
tion.
When the user fills out this form the input is sent from the client to the server.
At the server side, this input is validated by a JavaBean. All the input fields are
tested to see if the input has appropriate form and size in accordance with security
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guideline 2.1.1, “Validate input”. The input is in addition validated on the server
side according to the security guideline 2.2.1, “Validate input on the server side”.
After validation, it is shipped off to the database. The validation assures that
the input will not cause a SQL injection or buffer overflow6 attack.
As we have checked all input coming from the client before building the SQL
query, we have thus used the JavaBean, or a part of the controller, as a choke point.
Being able to direct all input validation through the JavaBean adds to the MVC-
architecture, and it is in accordance with security guideline 2.1.3, “Keep it simple”
witch states that security critical operations should go through a choke point.
Figure 6.6: Screen dump that shows how the page looks like when a user has entered
wrong input in the registration form.
In our application, if the information in the registration form is incorrect, the
user gets feedback from the application on which fields that are filled in incorrectly.
This is shown in Figure 6.6.
Stored procedures
Server side input validation is the most effective method of preventing SQL injec-
tion [21]. Another way to work around the SQL injection problem is by avoiding
dynamic SQL queries. This can be achieved by using stored procedures, in Java
“CallableStatement” and “PreparedStatement” [1] can be used. A stored procedure
6Buffer overflow attacks are not likely to occur on the Java-platform, since arrays and fields have
strict regulations on what kind of input that is allowed. Although, one should be aware of, that
some compilers does not check the code good enough, and therefore makes buffer overflow attacks
possible to bring about.
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is a group of precompiled SQL statements. The procedure accepts input as parame-
ters so that a dynamic query is avoided. Although input is put into the precompiled
query as it is, since the query itself is in a different format, it does not have the
effect of changing the query as expected. By using stored procedures one may let the
database handle the execution of the query instead of asking it to execute a query
we have built.
Client side scripts
It is definitely possible to check user input on the client side, by using JavaScript.
This approach has nothing to do with security though, because the input will need to
be revalidated when reaching the server side. Although client side checking disallows
the attacker to enter malicious data directly into the input fields, that alone is not
enough to prevent an SQL injection. Client side scripts only check for input in the
browser, and this does not guarantee that the information will remain the same till
it reaches the server. There are tools that can capture the request going from the
client and change it before sending it to the server. The attacker can also inject
commands into the querystring variables which are not checked by the client side
script [21]. According to security guideline 2.2.1, “Validate input on the server side”
all data that passes the invisible security barrier needs to be validated when reaching
the server side. Client side scripts may be used to enhance functionality, or help the
user. Most of the time, invalid input in forms is not a malicious attacker, but rather
a mistyping from an end user. By checking input on the client side, one may short
down response time, so that a user don’t have to wait for the validation procedure
on the server side. This is the only advantage of client side checking, because all
validation needs to be duplicated on the server side.
6.2.6 Preventing cross site scripting
Our system is a ticket ordering system. It would be an advantage if, when the user
is looking at the number of tickets left, he or she would be able to refresh the page
to see if the number of tickets is decreasing. In that case, the user might want to
hurry to order.
To be able to use the refresh-button in the browser, we had to use include7 instead
of frames8 in our applications index-file. When using “include”, the risk of Cross Site
Scripting (XSS) exist. Therefore, we have entered following code into our index-file
to show how this can be avoided if using include.
<%
String pagestr = request.getParameter("page");
Vector pagelist = new Vector();
pagelist.add("index.jsp");
pagelist.add("Mainpage.jsp");
pagelist.add("Top.jsp");
pagelist.add("Login.jsp");
pagelist.add("Logout.jsp");
pagelist.add("About.jsp");
pagelist.add("ContactInformation.jsp");
7For a definition of Server Side Include, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
8For a definition of frames, see “Glossary” in Appendix A.
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pagelist.add("secure/SecureEvents.jsp");
pagelist.add("Events.jsp");
pagelist.add("SecEvents.jsp");
if(pagelist.contains(pagestr)){
}else{
pagestr="Mainpage.jsp";
}
%>
By doing this, the browser can only open URLs that are allowed by the user, because
the URL is validated by the code. After the user has logged in, we use frames.
What is a problem here, though, is that the URL is validated on the client-
side. Throughout this report we have stressed that all validation should occur on
the server side. But users can’t enter any URL’s into the system, since all of the
input is validated. Only administrators and super users can do that. Therefore, this
validation of the URL is a way to protect the user on the client-side from malicious
actions conducted by administrators and/or super users with cruel intentions.
6.2.7 Error messages
If a user tries to log onto the system with false user credentials, we have implemented
an error message that is returned to the client. This is done instead of revealing
system information that might be exploited by malicious hackers.
Figure 6.7 shows the error message presented the user when the login functionality
fails. Using this type of error messages is not only according to system requirement
EHR2, in chapter 4, “Requirements engineering”, but also according to the security
guideline 2.1.2 “Fail securely” in chapter 2, “Security guidelines”.
Multithreading
The JavaBean we created uses the synchronized-block in all methods that handles
requests from the client side. The setEmail()-method shown underneath is an ex-
ample of a method using the synchronized block. The synchronized block prevents
problems with multithreading.
public synchronized void setEmail(String newEmail)
{
if(newEmail != null)
email = newEmail.trim();
else
email = " ";
}
When using JavaBeans, the business logic becomes more structured and maintain-
able in the application. But it is important to be aware of that beans shared between
multiple pages, must be thread-safe. This is why we make use of the synchronized
block.
Multithreading is an issue only for beans in the session and the application scopes.
Beans in the page and request scope can be executed by more than one thread,
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Figure 6.7: Screen dump of the error message that occurs when a user enters wrong
login credentials to the system.
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initiated by requests from the same client. This may happen if the user opens multiple
browsers, repeatedly clicks a “Submit button” in a form, or if the application uses
frames to request multiple JSP pages at the same time. Application scope beans are
shared by all application users, hence it is very likely that more than one thread is
using an application scope bean.
Java provides mechanisms for dealing with concurrent access to resources, such
as synchronized block and thread notification methods [2].
By using the principle of multithreading, integrity will be maintained. In addition,
the system requirement system requirement SR2, on simultaneous users is be taken
into account.
6.3 Summary
This chapter has introduced an implementation of the application designed earlier
in this report. It has also shown how some of the security issues pointed out in
previous chapters has been solved, both according to security guidelines and system
specification.
In this report there has been described the development of a web application,
where the focus was aimed at security throughout the development process. The
following chapter will contain a discussion of the results we came up with, and a
conclusion that presents what we have achieved.
Chapter 7
Discussion
There are two important trends to note concerning web applications. First of all,
they represent an increasing share of the total number of applications developed.
Second, they get more available every day. Over the last few years, more security
critical operations have been included in them as well. For instance, online shops
that allows you to pay by credit card are widespread.
Security is an important topic, not only to web applications, but to all kinds
of software. The reason why software needs to focus on security is that it tend
to contain sensitive information that should not be compromized. The amount of
threats relevant to web applications puts them in a special position. The fact that
they are open to attacks potentially launched by anyone connected to the Internet,
implies that a heavy load of threat countermeasures needs to be employed in order
to protect vulnerable assets. Web applications do require new security measures, as
traditional external ones, like firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS), are no
longer sufficient.
It is important to understand that security is not something that may be added
to a system after a complete development process. This is practically infeasible, as
is adding new functionality at the end of a software development project.
Some people argue that being security conscious all the way through the devel-
opment process is costly as well, and it does require some extra time and effort, but
it saves you the surprise at the end of things. You will need security, and the best
way to make sure that you are doing a good job protecting assets, is making sure
you pay attention to potential pitfalls along the way.
We started off this report by providing security guidelines for software develop-
ment. Guidelines are useful to avoid well-known threats, but they also encourage a
clean design that will result in a surveyable system, so they may in fact help prevent
future threats as well. Our guidlines included a separate part concerning web appli-
cation security specifically. We also produced a security guideline focusing on how
to avoid attacks in a web application. This guideline was developed for The Centre
for Information Security (SIS), and will be published on their web page. The devel-
opment of guidelines represented the first sub goal of our project, as they formed a
basis on which the rest of the report was built, and an overall goal was to be security
concious throughout the process.
Another goal was to design a web application with regards to various require-
ments, identify what vulnerabilities and threats the application would be exposed
to, and perform a risk analysis ranking threats identified. Through the entire de-
91
92 Web Application Security
velopment process we were to take our security guidelines into consideration, and
present specific technology solutions at the end of the implementation phase.
In this discussion, we would like to shed light on how it has been developing
a system using our proposed security guidelines, and focusing on making a system
secure through the entire development process. We will be looking back at our
security guidelines, and present some examples of how they have translated to specific
design and implementation details. We will also go through the development phases,
and identify what was done with regard to security in each of them.
Developing with regard to security
Software systems, and especially those accessible via the Internet, are continuously
exposed to threats, both from the inside as well as the outside. We have made the
assumption that once a user has been authenticated, his or her intentions are good,
and we have thus set the focus on external attacks. Where it was relevant we did
present measures on how to avoid internal attacks as well. Most of the time, internal
attacks are not preventable by measures one may implement. Rather they must be
prevented by user awareness. Logging might be used detecting inside attacks. They
may be hard to prevent during a development phase, because an inside attack might
invole that a crook is part of the development team. At the end of a development
process, checking the code for hidden backdoors1, is a possible countermeasure to
circumvent the work of a crook.
Security guidelines, general
We have come to use the majority of our security guidelines throughout the devel-
opment process, and their relation to various design decisions and implementation
details have been stated throughout previous chapters. Here, some examples show-
ing how the security guidelines have mapped to various parts of the development
process will be repeated. The validate input guideline is important, validating prop-
erly helps avoiding SQL injection attacks. It is taken care of in our JavaBean. The
second guideline concerns proper handling of failure. One needs to design a system
that has fault tolerance, as there is a 100% guarantee that at some point, the sys-
tem will fail. The question is how you deal with it. The system should not reveal
critical information under any circumstances as this might be exploited to launch
an attack on the basis of information disclosure. Our system has a default error
message that is sent to the user in case of failure during the login process. The
guideline that says the system should be kept as simple as possible is realized with
the Model-View-Controller (MVC) architecture. The choke point handling requests
is part of the controller in our Model 2 version of the MVC architecture. Trusted
components have also been used, for instance, our password encryption algorithm is
the approved SHA-1, embedded in the MySQL database implementation. We have
strived to practice defense in depth, which is illustrated by the password encryption.
Should the database be compromised, the passwords will be useless as they are en-
crypted. The password encryption is also an illustration of the guideline instructing
1Also called a trapdoor. An undocumented way of gaining access to a program, online service
or an entire computer system. The backdoor is written by the programmer who creates the code
for the program. It is often only known by the programmer. A backdoor is a potential security risk
[44].
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that one should protect the weakest link. The next guideline concerns privileges of
users, and states that they should be kept at a minimum. We have designed three
different system roles to fulfill this requirement, and they are each provided the least
privileges possible. Compartmentalization is also realized by the use of the MVC
architecture. Awareness is not something that one may implement to a system, but
rather to potential users.
Security guidelines, web application specific
One of the main lessons one should remember when developing web applications,
is not to trust the client side. This is expressed in our security guideline validate
input on the server side. This is necessary as it is only the server side that we
are in control of. One may do validation on the client side as well, but only with
the intent to speed up the system. There is nothing to gain on doing this in the
sense of security. Encrypt communication lines is another important guideline, it
is realized with the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL). This will avoid for instance
relese of message content, and traffic analysis. The last guideline, limit cache usage,
is treated in the implementation chapter, where it is explicitly shown how to avoid
caching of sensitive information.
Requirements engineering phase
We started focusing on security already in the requirements engineering phase. All
requirements related to security were identified and emphasized. Using misuse cases,
we modelled where a potential crook illegitimately might try to compromise the sys-
tem, for instance by elevation of privileges, phishing or SQL injections. In addition,
misuse cases introduced a link from each threat to possible countermeasures. We
believe that using misuse cases is effective, because it awakens developers, it is a
visual tool relating functionality to threats, and it identifies countermeasures. We
were in fact surprised that so many threats were relevant to our application. Looking
back, we are pleased we knew this early in the process. In addition to the advantages
mentioned, the threats identified by our misuse cases served as a basis for our risk
analysis. The fact that we chose to adapt the waterfall model to include a risk analyis
at the end of the requirements engineering phase, proved to be a good choice. It en-
abled us to proceed in the development process with knowledge of what threats were
most urgent. It was also important that the threats were provided scores on different
elements. This was important to understand the possible impact of a threat, as some
might be easily reproduced and relaunched, wheras others might have a great dam-
age potential. Making sure that various elements were included in the risk analysis
gave a good basis to rank the threats on. Conducting the risk analysis as early on
in the process, made it possible to design to avoid trouble.
Design phase
Identifying problem areas in the first phase, became a stepping-stone into the next,
the design phase. It gave us a head start since we already had thought about where
security might be threatened, and what countermeasures we could use to prevent
potential attacks.
In the design phase, the choice of technologies has been in accordance with the
guideline “Use and reuse trusted components”. Making use of components developed
94 Web Application Security
by trusted third parties, tested by multiple users, and with no documented indication
as to why it should not be considered safe, turned out to be advantageous.
The architecture we chose was the MVC. This architecture is well tested, and has
proven to be appropriate when developing applications on the Java platform. This
model also applies to several of our security guidelines.
Implementation phase
In the implementation phase we realized security functionality planned for in previous
development phases. Technology specific solutions were provided, and high ranked
threats from the requirements engineering phase were prioritized. Reaching this
phase, the value of our previous work on planning for a secure system, became
evident. With a clean cut design, and fuctionality that was well planned for, the
implementation was straighforward. We focused on illustrating security critical parts
of the system, such as login functionality, cache, and password protection in the
database.
Summary
Such a thing as a 100 % secure computer system does not, and probably will never
exist, but by being security conscious throughout the development process, one may
reduce system vulnerabilities. Focusing on a security oriented development, many
pitfalls may be avoided.
We have performed one iteration of the waterfall model, reaching the implemen-
tation phase. Throughout the development process, we have worked by our own
guidelines. We believe that this has helped us to stay focused and security conscious
along the way. It also contributed to making the application that we developed less
vulnerable to threats. The security guidelines have been used to support our design
and implementation decisions. It has been a valuable reference. We have learned
that there are plenty of threats and vulnerabilities that needs to be handled, even
when developing a small system. The value of ranking these threats, so that one
may take care of the most urgent threats, carefully has become evident, and also
the fact that one have to decide on an acceptable level of risk. Zero risk is neither
necessary nor practical, and it comes down to the value of the assets in the system.
The risk rating has been referenced throughout the report, and it has been of great
help. It is possible that if the system were to be scaled, and more iterations were
to be conducted, one would have to reevaluate the threat ranking on account of an
incrase in system complexity.
There are many small web applications today, by example in-house applications.
They may represent great security problems, especially as they are often part of a
bigger environment, and when compromized they may for instance provide illegiti-
mate acces to connected units. The system developed in this project is a small one.
We believe that the principals that one should keep in mind when developing systems
are independent of the size of the system, and that bigger applications are exposed
to exactly the same threats as smaller ones. This report might thus be a valuable
resource even if you are developing a much bigger system. The only difference would
be the complexity. The techniques are still the same. It would not have been feasible
within the limits of this project, to design for, and develop a gigantic web application.
Nor would it have illustrated different security principals.
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Web applications exist in a security critical environment. There is a difference
between systems that are security critical, like Internet banks, in which faults are
unacceptable, and other web applications, where security might be important but
not crucial. Either way, these systems can not rely on traditional external measures.
This report has underlined the positive effect of being security concious when devel-
oping a system. Security is something that should be planned for, and kept in focus
throughout the development process.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and further work
The application described in this report has been described with the focus directed
at security.
Focusing on security throughout the development process has been a challenge.
But having the security guidelines as reference points through the development
process, gave us a clear image of how to build the application with regard to identified
vulnerabilities. After we had identified relevant threats, and suggested countermea-
sures, we could begin designing solutions. This made it relatively easy to implement
countermeasures to threats that had proven themselves dominant through the de-
velopment process. We believe the security measures we implemented on the Java
platform, can be used as a suggestion to how others can solve the same problems. We
found the security guidelines we suggested very useful throughout the development
of our application, and we believe these guidelines can be of good help to others that
are to develop web applications.
When working on this report, we experienced the difficulty of finding information
on how to create secure web applications, in addition to descriptions of vulnerabilities,
threats, and countermeasures. We therefore believe that our report will provide
information that will come in handy for those who are to develop a web application,
both smaller ones, like ours, and large ones. The fundamental principles for security
are the same. As our guidelines are platform independent, they could be applied
even if an application were to be developed using a different programming language.
8.1 Further work
Further work that can be done after this report, is to complete the implementation of
the web application, and scale it up according to our design. This might imply that
new iterations of the waterfall model have to be conducted, and this may for instance
result in a update of the risk analysis. Then it could be tested, and maintained
according to the waterfall model.
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Appendix A
Glossary
Here are explanation to words that might come in handy reading the report. The
definitions are mainly from Webopedia [44], while some are from Wikipedia [46].
ACID. ACID stands for atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability. These four
properties are considered to be key transaction processing features of database
management systems.
API. Short for Application Program Interface. A set of routines provided in libraries
that extends a language’s functionality.
Asset. An asset is a resource of value such as the data in a database or on the file
system, or a system resource.
Atomicity. Atomicity refers to the ability of the DBMS to guarantee that either all
of the tasks of a transaction are performed or none of them are.
Attack. An attack is an action taken to harm an asset.
Auditing. Effective auditing and logging is the key to non-repudiation. Non-repudiation
guarantees that a user cannot deny performing an operation or initiating a
transaction.
Authentication. The process of uniquely identifying the clients of your applica-
tions and services. In security parlance authenticated clients are referred to as
principals.
Authorization. This is the process that governs the resources and operations that
authenticated clients are permitted to access.
Audit trails. An audit trail is a series of records of computer events, about an
operating system, an application, or user activities.
Availability. Means that the system remains available to legitimate users.
Cache. From an Internet browsers point of view, when something is cached, the files
and graphics is saved locally from web sites you have previously visited.
Confidentiality. Also referred to as privacy, the process of making sure that date
remains private and confidential, and that it cannot be viewed by unauthorized
users or eavesdroppers. Encryption is frequently used to enforce confidentiality.
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Consistency. Consistency refers to the database being in a legal state when the
transaction begins and when it ends. They are the key transaction processing
features of a database management system, or DBMS.
Cookies. A cookie is a small bit of information that a web server can store tem-
porarily within your browser. A common use of cookies is to store information
entered into a form so it does not need to be reentered on subsequent visits.
Countermeasures. A safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates a risk. In
this report it is important to notice that the main goal is to prevent attacks on
a security level.
Data hashing. A mathematical summary that can be used to provide message in-
tegrity.
Digital signature. An authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a mes-
sage to attach a code that acts as a signature.
DNS. Domain Name Server. Is an Internet service that translates domain names
into IP addresses. Because domain names are alphabetic, they’re easier to
remember. The Internet however, is really based on IP addresses. Every time
you use a domain name, therefore, a DNS service must translate the name into
the corresponding IP address.
Durability. Durability refers to the guarantee that once the user has been notified
of success, the transaction will persist, and not be undone.
Encryption. Application of a specific algorithm to plaintext data so as to alter
the appearance of the data making it incomprehensible to those who are not
authorized to see the information.
Form fields. Form fields are sections in an outline where to enter input data.
Frames. A feature supported by most modern web browsers that enables the web
author to divide the browser display area into two or more sections (frames).
The contents of each frame are taken from a different web page. Frames provide
great flexibility in designing web pages, but many designers avoid them because
they are supported unevenly by current browsers.
Handshake protocol. The handshake protocol allows the server and client to au-
thenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption and MAC1 algorithm and
encryption keys to be used to protect data sent in an SSL record.
Header. Header refers to supplemental data placed at the beginning of a block of
data being stored or transmitted, which contain information for the handling
of the data block.
Hidden fields. Hidden fields are form fields that not are shown to the user through
the web browser, but contains information from the server.
HTML. The Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) is the authoring language used
to create documents on the WWW. It defines the structure and layout of a web
document by using a variety of tags and attributes.
1Message Authentication Code is a short piece of information used to authenticate a message.
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HTTP. The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) defines how messages are for-
matted and transmitted, and what actions web servers and browsers should
take in response to various commands.
Integrity. It is the guarantee that data is protected from accidental or deliberate
modification. Like privacy, integrity is a key concern for data passed over net-
works. Integrity for data in transit is typically provided by hashing techniques
and message authentication codes (MAC).
Internet. The Internet is a massive network of networks, a networking infrastruc-
ture. It connects millions of computers together globally, forming a network in
which any computer can communicate with any other computer as long as they
are both connected to the Internet. Information that travels over the Internet
does so via a variety of languages known as protocols.
Invisible security barrier. The invisible security barrier is a conceptual barrier
between the server and the client. Everything that has crossed this barrier
from the client to the server, may be unsafe. Never trust data that have passed
the security barrier, no matter how deep in the HTML it is hidden.
IPSec. IPSec is an extended IP protocol which enables secure data transfer. It
provides services similar to SSL/TLS, however. IPSec can be used for creation
of encrypted tunnels between networks (Virtual Private Network (VPN)) so
called tunnel mode, or for encryption of traffic between two hosts so called
transport mode.
Isolation. Isolation refers to the ability of the application to make operations in a
transaction appear isolated from all other operations.
MAC. A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a one-way hash computed from a
message and some secret data. Its purpose is to detect if the message has been
altered.
OpenSSL. OpenSSL is an open source implementation of the SSL and TLS proto-
cols. The core library (written in the C programming language) implements the
basic cryptographic functions and provides various utility functions. Wrappers
allowing the use of the OpenSSL library in a variety of computer languages are
available.
Principle of least privilege. The principle of least privilege requires that a user
be given no more privilege than necessary to perform a job. Ensuring least
privilege requires identifying what the user’s job is, determining the minimum
set of privileges required to perform that job, and restricting the user to a
domain with those privileges and nothing more. By denying to subjects trans-
actions that are not necessary for the performance of their duties, those denied
privileges cannot be used to circumvent the organizational security policy.
Query strings. Query strings are text strings containing for instance SQL queries.
Server Side Include. Abbreviated SSI. A type of HTML comment that directs
the web server to dynamically generate data for the web page whenever it is
requested. The simplest command is #include, which inserts the contents of
another file. This is especially useful for ensuring that boilerplate components,
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such as headers and footers, are the same on all pages throughout a web site.
To change a boilerplate element, you need only modify the include file, instead
of updating every individual web page.
Sessions. The period of time a user interfaces with an application. The user session
begins when the user accesses the application and ends when the user quits the
application.
SSL. The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is a commonly-used protocol for managing
the security of a message transmission on the Internet. SSL uses a public-
and-private key encryption system, which also includes the use of a digital
certificate.
Strong authentication. Strong authentication is authentication in which the iden-
tities of networked users, clients and servers are verified without transmitting
passwords over the network.
Strong encryption. Strong encryption are plaintext encrypted with ciphers that
are essentially unbreakable without the decryption keys.
SQL. Standard Query Language is a standardized query language for requesting
information from a database.
TCP/IP. The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) are pro-
tocols that are the basis for transmitting and routing data packets on the
Internet. The Internet Protocol is the one thing that all current Internet sites
have in common.
Threat. A threat is a potential occurrence, malicious or otherwise, that may harm
an asset.
URL. Uniform Resource Locator. Specifies the location of resources. It is the global
address of documents and other resources on the WWW. The first part of the
address indicates what protocol to use, and the second part specifies the IP
address or the domain name where the resource is located.
Vulnerability. A weakness that make a threat possible.
World Wide Web. The World Wide Web, or simply web, is a way of accessing
information over the medium of the Internet. It is an information-sharing
model that is built on top of the Internet. The Web uses the HTTP protocol,
only one of the languages spoken over the Internet, to transmit data.
XML. Extensible Markup Language is a meta language used to define data for-
mats. It was originally designed to meet the challenges of large-scale electronic
publishing, but XML is also playing an increasingly important role in the ex-
change of a wide variety of data on the web and elsewhere. Modern systems
makes often use of XML when storing data, when this is advantageous for
inter-operability with other systems and sources.
Appendix B
Use cases
This is an introduction to misuse cases. To understand the concept and functionality
of misuse cases, we start off presenting use cases. Information about use cases is from
[7] and [39]. Facts on misuse cases comes from [28] and [29].
B.1 Use cases
Use cases are helpful tools for the elicitation of, communication about and documen-
tation of requirements [28]. This section contains a short introduction to use cases.
The use cases are described to familiarize the reader with this tool and hopefully
provide a understanding of misuse cases as well. They will be introduced later on in
this chapter.
The standard employed in the use cases is the Unified Modeling Language (UML)
[7]. Notations is explained in the succeeding sections.
We split the use case templates into two groups. These are:
1. Use case diagrams - Use case diagrams are sketches of a scenario between
an actor1 and a system.
2. Textual use cases - Textual use cases are a detailed description of every step
in the scenario which an actor must go through to achieve a wanted goal. We
will not go into these here.
It is important to notice that use cases only describe what a system is doing - not
how the system is doing it.
B.1.1 Use case diagrams
Figure B.1 depicts a use case diagram.
• A scenario is a sequence of steps describing an interaction between a user and
a system.
• The person is an actor. An actor is a role that a user plays with respect to the
system.
1An actor is a role that a user plays with respect to the system.
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Figure B.1: A use case is a set of scenarios tied together by a common user goal.
• The square illustrates the system where all of the action takes place.
• The action explains the specific plot the actor is doing to the system.
There are four types of relationships in use cases. These are:
uses This is used when describing a link between an actor and an action. Default
notation.
include This is used when repeating oneself in two or more separate use cases. One
does this to avoid repetition.
generalization This is used when describing a variation on normal behavior. One
does this to describe the incident casually.
extends This is used when describing a variation on normal behavior. One does
this when a more controlled form is wanted, declaring extension points in the
base use case.
B.2 Misuse cases
A misuse case is the inverse of a use case. It describes a function that the system
should not allow. While use cases represents positive actions in a system, misuse cases
represents the negative. Misuse cases describe functions in a system that results in
losses for an organization or some specific stakeholder, and they identify potential
risks and misuse.
B.2.1 Misuse case diagrams
Figure B.2 depicts a misuse case. The diagram shows the positive use case and the
negative misuse case.
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Figure B.2: A misuse case is the inverse of a use case. In this example, a crook get
his hands on an actors password.
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• A new actor is introduced in the misuse cases, namely the mis-actor. The mis-
actor is the inverse of an actor, that is, an actor that one does not want the
system to support, an actor who initiates misuse cases.
• A new action is also introduced, the mis-action. The mis-action describes the
negative plot the mis-actor is doing to the system.
The relations in misuse cases are:
uses This is used when describing a link between an actor and an action. Default
notation.
include This is used when repeating oneself in two or more separate use cases. One
does this to avoid repetition.
generalization This is used when describing a variation on normal behavior. One
does this to describe the incident casually.
extends This is used when describing a variation on normal behavior. One does
this when a more controlled form is wanted, declaring extension points in the
base use case.
detects This is used when one makes a link between an action that may detect
misuse in the system and a mis-action.
prevents This is used when one makes a link between an action that may prevent
misuse in the system and the mis-action it is preventing.
B.3 Summary
This chapter has given a brief introduction on use cases and misuse cases. The misuse
cases will be used in the chapter on requirements engineering 4.
Appendix C
J2EE
Java 2 Enterprise Edition is a platform that is suitable for designing large, complex
web applications that interacts with other programs and applications using Java
technologies. The J2EE technology is a product from Sun Microsystems, and a
technology widely adapted by the software industry today. JSP is a key part of the
J2EE platform, and can take advantages of the many Java Enterprise libraries.
To get some understanding of the benefits one can achieve using J2EE, some of
the technologies included in J2EE are briefly introduced in this section.
C.1 Struts
Struts is a project where the goal is to provide an open source framework for building
Java web applications, created by The Apache Software Foundation.
The core of the Struts framework is a flexible control layer based on standard
technologies like Java Servlets, JavaBeans, and XML. Struts encourages application
architectures based on the Model 2 approach1, a variation of the classic Model-View-
Controller design paradigm.
Struts provides its own Controller component and integrates with other tech-
nologies to provide the Model and the View. For the Model, Struts can interact
with standard data access technologies, like the Java Database Connectivity driver
(JDBC)2 and Enterprise Java Beans (EJB). For the View, Struts works well with
JavaServer Pages (JSP).
The Struts framework provides the invisible underpinnings every professional web
application needs to survive. Struts helps you create an extensible development
environment for your application, based on published standards and proven design
patterns. For small applications, Struts is not recommended due to a lot of overhead
[37].
C.2 Enterprise Java Beans (EJB)
Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) is a Java API developed by Sun Microsystems that
defines a component architecture for multi-tier client/server systems.
1Described in chapter5, “Design”.
2Described in chapter 5 “Design”.
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EJB systems allow developers to focus on the actual business architecture of the
model, rather than worry about endless amounts of programming and coding needed
to connect all the working parts. This task is left to EJB server vendors. Developers
just design (or purchase) the needed EJB components and arrange them on the
server.
Because EJB systems are written in Java, they are platform independent. Be-
ing object oriented, they can be implemented into existed systems with little or no
recompiling and configuring [44].
The Struts framework contains readily implemented EJBs that developers can
make use of.
C.3 Java Authentication and Authorization Service
(JAAS)
The Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) is a set of APIs that
can be used for two purposes. First of all, for authentication of users, to reliably
and securely determine who is currently executing Java code, regardless of whether
the code is running as an application, an applet, a bean, or a servlet. Second, for
authorization of users, to determine reliably and securely who is currently executing
Java code, regardless of whether the code is running as an application, an applet, a
bean, or a servlet.
JAAS authentication is performed in a pluggable fashion. This permits Java ap-
plications to remain independent from underlying authentication technologies. New
or updated technologies can be plugged in without requiring modifications to the
application itself. JAAS authorization extends the existing Java security architec-
ture that uses a security policy to specify what access rights are granted to executing
code. That is, permissions are granted based on code characteristics, where the code
comes from and whether it is digitally signed, and if so, by whom [13].
JAAS APIs can be used for both authentication and authorization, as follows
[13]:
• For authenticating users to determine securely who is executing Java code, re-
gardless of whether the code is a stand-alone Java technology-based application,
an applet, an Enterprise JavaBean (EJB) component, or a servlet.
• For authorization of users to make sure they have the right permissions required
to perform their actions.
• Pure Java technology implementation
• Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework implementation for au-
thenticating users
• Single sign-on support
• Flexible access control policy for user-based, group-based, and role-based au-
thorization
• Sample authentication modules using Java Naming and Directory Interface
(JNDI), UNIX Operating Environment, Windows NT, Kerberos or Keystore.
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C.4 Common Object Request Broker Architecture
(CORBA)
CORBA is a short for Common Object Request Broker Architecture, an architec-
ture that enables pieces of programs to communicate with one another regardless of
what programming language they were written in or what operating system they’re
running on. CORBA is developed by an industry consortium known as the Object
Management Group (OMG) [44].
C.5 Remote Method Invocation (RMI)
RMI is a short for Remote Method Invocation, a set of protocols being developed
by Sun’s JavaSoft division that enables Java objects to communicate remotely with
other Java objects. RMI is a relatively simple protocol, but unlike the more complex
protocol CORBA, it works only with Java objects [44].
C.6 Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI)
Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) enables Java platform-based applica-
tions to access multiple naming and directory services. Part of the Java Enterprise
application programming interface (API) set, JNDI makes it possible for developers
to create portable applications that are enabled for a number of different naming
and directory services, including, file systems, directory services such as Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), and distributed object systems such as CORBA,
RMI, and EJB [44].
JNDI organizes and locates components within a distributed computing environ-
ment similarly to the way that card catalogs (and increasingly computer applications)
organize and represent the locations of books within a library. A distributed appli-
cation needs a mean of locating components in the same way that the library patron
needs a mean of locating the book. Just rummaging around inside a library - or
an application - is not an efficient way to find a particular object. JNDI makes it
possible for application components to find each other. Because different naming
and directory service providers can be seamlessly connected through the API, Java
applications using it can be easily integrated into various environments and coexist
with legacy applications.
C.7 eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) is a set of guidelines for constructing and or-
dering data in a document. XML contains three cooperating components. The XML
parsers, the XML processors and the XML applications. The parsers parse the XML
document into memory, the processors handle he parsed data, perhaps making trans-
formation using a stylesheet. The parser and processor functionality can be bundled
together in an inseparable component. The applications act in the data structure
generated by the XML structure [2].
One can use XML to store data on a web server, and use JSP files to display the
data. Using XML for data storage is getting more and more popular. To learn more
about advantages of using XML, we refer to the article [45] from JavaWorld.
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Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
The Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) is a set of packages that provides a frame-
work and implementations for encryption, key generation and key agreement, and
Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms. Support for encryption includes
symmetric, asymmetric, block, and stream ciphers. The software also supports secure
streams and sealed objects.
C.8 Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)
The Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) is a set of packages that enable secure
Internet communications. It implements a Java technology version of Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. It includes functionality
for data encryption, server authentication, message integrity, and optional client
authentication.
The SunJSSE implementation now supports a number of additional ciphersuites.
They include ciphersuites using AES as symmetric cipher and ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman with RSA authentication.
In addition to the simple X.509 based trustmanager previously available in the
SunJSSE provider, it now supports a second, PKIX-compliant trust manager. It is
implemented using the default CertPath PKIX implementation.
C.9 Summary
J2EE is more and more adapted within the software industry today. It is a well
developed tool to use when creating an application from scratch, and when linking
several programs together as an application.
Appendix D
Ticked requirements
Following are the requirements tables
• before login,
• regular users,
• administrator users,
• super users,
• the database,
• system requirements, and
• error handling.
The requirements implemented in our application, are ticked off.
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Browse the page (BP) Ok?
a) Site information, contact information and a list of upcoming events
should be available. V
Register a user account (RUA)
RUA1. User states personal information.
a) First name, last name, address, postal code, post office, V
phone number and email should be provided by the user.
*b) Input should be validated on the server side. V
RUA2. User selects a username.
a) The username should be unique. V
RUA3. User selects a password.
a) Password should contain eight characters. V
b) Password should contain small and big characters.
RUA4. User should read and agree to a personal information protection statement.
*RUA5. User should read and state scrambled letters to the application.
Standard login (SL)
*a) A new session should be created. V
*b) Input should be validated on the server side. V
*c) The user should be taken to another, secure page. V
*d) Time delays should be used when a user provides wrong
*e) Administrators and super users should log in from a hidden URL. credentials.
SL1. User states username.
SL2. User states password.
*a) Password should never be transferred in clear text. V
Forgot password feature (FP)
FP1. User clicks the “Forgot password?”-link.
*a) Ask the user to supply username and postal code.
*b) Input should be validated on the server side.
*c) Send mail to the users registered email address
with link to a page for resetting the password and a one-time password.
Table D.1: Ticked off requirements - Before login.
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Regular users (RU) Ok?
RU1. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
b) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when processing an order.
RU2. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
RU3. Order ticket(s).
a) The user should be able to order tickets.
b) The order should be limited by ten tickets.
c) Event headline and number of tickets ordered should be confirmed by user.
d) Address, postal code and post office should be confirmed by user.
*e) Payment information should be entered.
f) User repudiation should be avoided.
RU4. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated. V
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of V
15 minutes without user action.
Table D.2: Ticked off requirements - Regular users.
Administrator users (AU) Ok?
AU1. Edit events.
a) Should be able to add event(s).
b) Should be able to change event properties.
c) Should be able to remove event(s) by hiding them.
AU2. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
AU3. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
AU4. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated.
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of
15 minutes without user action.
Table D.3: Ticked off requirements - Administrator users.
114 Web Application Security
Super users (SU) Ok?
SU1. Edit events.
a) Should be able to add event(s).
b) Should be able to change event properties.
c) Should be able to delete event(s).
SU2. Edit personal information.
a) It should be possible to edit first name, last name.
address, postal code, post office, phone number and email when logged in.
SU3. Change password.
a) It should be possible to change the password when logged in.
SU4. Should be able to register administrator user account.
SU5. Should be able to edit administrator user account.
SU6. Should be able to delete administrator user account.
*SU7. Should be able to check the log.
SU8. Logout.
a) The user session should be invalidated.
b) A message confirming logout should be sent to the user.
c) Pressing the “logout” button should be equivalent to using
the browser to end the session.
*d) The user session should be invalidated after a period of
15 minutes without user action.
Table D.4: Ticked off requirements - Super users.
Database requirements (DBR) Ok?
*DBR1. Passwords should be stored encrypted. V
DBR2. The database should be available 90% of the time.
DBR3. The database should be able to cope with simultaneous access.
Table D.5: Ticked off requirements - Database requirements.
System requirements (SR) Ok?
SR1. Availability.
a) The system needs to be available 90% of the time.
SR2. Scalability.
a) The system should be able to handle 100 events simultaneously.
*SR3. Encryption.
a) As of the login session, all succeeding communication should be encrypted. V
*SR4. Caching.
a) Sensitive data should not be cached. V
*SR5. Input validation.
a) Headers, cookies, query strings, form fields and hidden
fields needs to be validated on the server side.
SR6. Log.
a) The system should keep track of actions and transactions
with a log.
Table D.6: Ticked off requirements - System requirements.
Web Application Security 115
Error handling requirements (EHR) Ok?
EHR1. System error should be reported to super user.
*EHR2. System error should present information page to regular user.
EHR3. User error should result in a constructed error page being return to the user. V
Table D.7: Ticked off requirements - Error handling requirements.
Appendix E
Screen dumps
This chapter contains screen dumps from our implemented application. Each figure
has a short comment on what the screen dump shows. Those pages that have been
relevant to our project, is presented and described in chapter 6, “Implementation”.
Figure E.1: OnlineTicketOrdering, mainpage.
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Figure E.2: OnlineTicketOrdering, contact information.
Figure E.3: OnlineTicketOrdering, about us.
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Figure E.4: OnlineTicketOrdering, event information.
Figure E.5: OnlineTicketOrdering, login.
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Figure E.6: OnlineTicketOrdering, registration form.
Figure E.7: OnlineTicketOrdering, registration error page.
Web Application Security 121
Figure E.8: OnlineTicketOrdering, registration ok.
Figure E.9: OnlineTicketOrdering, login.
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Figure E.10: OnlineTicketOrdering, login error page.
Figure E.11: OnlineTicketOrdering, logged in.
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Figure E.12: OnlineTicketOrdering, order.
Appendix F
Code
Figure F.1: Code - index.jsp, Part I.
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Figure F.2: Code - index.jsp, Part II.
Figure F.3: Code - Top.jsp.
Figure F.4: Code - Menu.jsp.
Web Application Security 127
Figure F.5: Code - Mainpage.jsp.
Figure F.6: Code - ContactInformation.jsp.
Figure F.7: Code - About.jsp.
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Figure F.8: Code - Events.jsp.
Figure F.9: Code - EventInfo.html.
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Figure F.10: Code - ConcertList.jsp, part I.
Figure F.11: Code - ConcertList.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.12: Code - TheaterList.jsp, part I.
Figure F.13: Code - TheaterList.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.14: Code - MusicalList.jsp, part I.
Figure F.15: Code - MusicalList.jsp, part II.
132 Web Application Security
Figure F.16: Code - Concerts.jsp, part I.
Web Application Security 133
Figure F.17: Code - Concerts.jsp, part II.
Figure F.18: Code - Theaters.html.
Figure F.19: Code - Musicals.html.
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Figure F.20: Code - Login.jsp.
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Figure F.21: Code - LoginError.jsp.
Figure F.22: Code - Logout.jsp.
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Figure F.23: Code - SecureEvents.jsp.
Figure F.24: Code - SecEventInfo.html.
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Figure F.25: Code - SecConcertList.jsp, part I.
Figure F.26: Code - SecConcertList.jsp, part II.
138 Web Application Security
Figure F.27: Code - SecTheaterList.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.28: Code - SecTheaterList.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.29: Code - SecMusicalList.jsp, part I.
Figure F.30: Code - SecMusicalList.jsp, part II.
Web Application Security 141
Figure F.31: Code - SecConcerts.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.32: Code - SecConcerts.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.33: Code - SecTheaters.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.34: Code - SecTheaters.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.35: Code - SecMusicals.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.36: Code - SecMusicals.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.37: Code - Order.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.38: Code - Order.jsp, part II.
Figure F.39: Code - OrderOK.jsp.
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Figure F.40: Code - OrderCancel.jsp.
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Figure F.41: Code - UserInfo.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.42: Code - UserInfo.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.43: Code - CheckUserInfo.jsp, part I.
Figure F.44: Code - CheckUserInfo.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.45: Code - InsertUser.jsp, part I.
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Figure F.46: Code - InsertUser.jsp, part II.
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Figure F.47: Code - UserInfo.java, part I.
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Figure F.48: Code - UserInfo.java, part II.
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Figure F.49: Code - UserInfo.java, part III.
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Figure F.50: Code - UserInfo.java, part IV.
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Figure F.51: Code - UserInfo.java, part V.
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Figure F.52: Code - UserInfo.java, part VI.
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Figure F.53: Code - ConnectManager.java, part I.
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Figure F.54: Code - ConnectManager.java, part II.
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Figure F.55: Code - ConnectManager.java, part III.
164 Web Application Security
Figure F.56: Code - Web.xml, part I.
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Figure F.57: Code - Web.xml, part II.
166 Web Application Security
Figure F.58: Code - Server.xml.
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